


the christian SCHOLAR



Post-Christian Man / Samuel H. Miller

Scholars and Machines / Jacob Neusner

The Context of Confirmation / Joseph Sittler

Huston Smith / Elton Trueblood / Alexander Miller

Perry LeFeuvre

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

The Christian Scholar is a journal devoted to exploring the issues that arise as the intellectual life of our day is examined in the light of Christian faith. It exists to recognize the contributions to the theological enterprise of scholars working faithfully in their own disciplines, and to bring theological dimensions to bear upon intellectual perplexities and cultural problems. It seeks to provide a means for dialogue among persons who take seriously our present predicament and who believe that analyses of Christian faith and culture, of moral discipline and intellectual judgment, and of confused aspirations and values in contemporary society are essential both to the health of academic communities and to the responsible fulfillment of the vocation of Christian scholars and teachers.

Although a critical approach is stressed, we seek primarily to affirm, not to deny. What we wish to affirm is the idea of wholeness versus fragmentation. We wish to affirm that the world is a creation, open to investigation and learning; that there is a Holy order of meaning in which the search for truth and the concern for its communication is meaningful; that the endeavors of creative thought and academic learning can be renewed by scholarship practiced as a Christian vocation; and that all the various fragments — whether in racial hostilities, enmities between nations, isolations of academic fields, estrangements between persons or between men and God — are broken pieces intended for reconciliation in God's redemptive work in Jesus Christ. The affirmation which is proposed is that God has something immediate and real to do, both in judgment and in love, with all that men attempt in the work of culture and the mind.

We take God seriously and know that this poses serious problems and responsibilities. We share the difficulty of posing the question of God in its relevance for men in a world which has "come of age" — where the affirmations of belief are hard but where there is discontent in unbelief. We sense the common responsibility of pointing to God's presence and action in the midst of intellectual life and scholarly work. By relating Christian belief to the world of learning, all areas of knowledge can become avenues for encounter with truth, and faith can be held as a way of understanding. Though the Christian scholar does not have programmatic precision, he can serve God and the world meaningfully through study pursued as a vocation. His own life can become a vocation.

As Christians, we believe in freedom of the mind. This is the freedom to rigorously inquire after knowledge in all fields and to interpret what is learned as the truth itself demands. It is the freedom of respecting the relative autonomy of secular disciplines. At the same time it is the freedom for the Christian thinker to make clear that what is known through intellectual endeavor has its ultimate meaning as a worldly matter in the light of God's providence. Thus the freedom which is insisted upon as grounded in faith is freedom to pursue all knowledge and to place that pursuit in a framework fashioned by God. Beneath such freedom there is a confident trust — an assurance that the faithful scholar is accepted of God. That confidence in turn is based upon God's faithfulness, the source of our final justification.

The Christian Scholar is published four times each year by the Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. and is associated closely with the Faculty Christian Fellowship. Its editorial policies, operations, and judgments are determined by the community of Christian scholars who constitute its Editorial Board and staff.

J. EDWARD DIRKS, *Editor*
for the Editorial Board.

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Higher Education and Christian Conscience

The Editor's Preface

The English historian Herbert Butterfield, our American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, and a number of others have shown us with considerable clarity the irony that seems to rest on the relationship between the intentions of statesmen and the results they achieve. George F. Kennan drew attention to this dilemma in an article which appeared some time ago in *The Atlantic Monthly*. He said there that "questions of method in foreign policy seem to be generally a much more fitting subject for Christian concern than questions of purpose." In support of his assertion he pointed out the extreme difficulty of gauging in advance the likely results of far-reaching decisions in the relations of governments to one another. The consequences almost never fully coincide with what was intended or expected. He drew two implications from this judgment. Decisions guided by sound principle, rather than by the private powers of calculation, are the more responsible; and especially the Christian citizen should give his critical attention not to the objectives but to the methods employed in a government's foreign policy.

We shall not dwell further upon the question of foreign policy. Rather it seems that insofar as Mr. Kennan's point is well made, we must ask whether we must and can translate his judgments into the area of college and university education. Because so much

of the literature in higher education, and so much of the writing about "faith and culture," is cast in terms of goals and purposes, we need to ask whether this is indeed the primary dimension for Christian concern and awareness. Perhaps we must, at least in our complex educational world, review and critically reflect on the methods by which education takes place. And in our technical and efficient culture, where methods so often seem merely to be the means by which one may move from "here" to "there," we may need to be reminded that the way wherein we walk is itself part of the destination toward which we move. There is a way of focusing upon methods which will get us nowhere. Especially in the area of learning, "education" has an academic connotation of mere methodology. The "how to" literature which exists in such abundance may fit certain simple needs, but everything surely cannot be reduced to the mere calculations of means.

In the article by Jacob Neusner which appears in this issue the relationships between certain aspects of humane scholarship and the technical apparatus of modern machines are analyzed. Though Mr. Neusner does not draw out broad implications about the means and ends of higher learning, he does show that any genuine concern with the aims of education must consider the ways by which our scholarship is under-

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taken, the limits imposed upon some of these ways, the inherent necessity of retaining others. Perhaps he will excuse us if we therefore permit his article to be a way of reminding ourselves that we may not connect directly the intentions of educational institutions or individual educators and the results that are achieved by them. A scholar, a scientist, and a teacher may not always know what it is he is doing and the nature of the results, but he can be critically understanding of the processes he is undertaking and the methods by which he is working. A college or a university may not be able to state its goals precisely; it may not feel that the responsible aspects of its tasks are fulfilled when the aims have been defined exactly and printed in the catalogue. But those responsible in its central life and work may be constantly at work to inquire into the ways truth is being known and communicated, personal life is deepened, and the critical capacities of curious minds are developed. We can be as sure in the realm of higher learning as Mr. Kennan is in foreign affairs that good methods will be in some way useful and that bad ones will be in some way pernicious.

There have been times when it was firmly maintained that the purposes and goals of education and its institutions were all, without exceptions, subject to Christian analysis and appraisal. There are still circles in which the impression is given that there is a natural identification of Christian concerns and educational objectives. The opening pages of many college cata-

logues imply the priority which is believed to be reserved for purposes, even when the remainder of the pages seem only vaguely connected with the statement of them. But it is certainly obvious that not all questions of academic policy and educational purpose have a certain and definable Christian significance. They reflect conflicts of departmental interests, tensions between different methodologies, differences of opinion about what is proper in the balance of different areas of study. Or they are questions which emerge from the nature of an educational institution, its location, relationships, or constituency, or from the emphasis of its key leaders. Whether the focus should be technological or humanistic, whether there should be requirements in foreign languages, in a laboratory science course, in Chinese art, or even in chapel services, as well as many others are questions the answers to which could probably hardly be argued on the grounds that they mattered ultimately to God. They may matter, but it would be hard to make a positive case, with our limited vision of the final or even the proximate aims of education, for any one of these rather than some alternative. We cannot calculate the results with that much accuracy.

Many questions of educational policy and purpose should of course be discussed vigorously. But insofar as the content of Christian theology or the concern of the Christian community is drawn upon, these should be brought to bear upon a critical understanding of the process which is being undertaken

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in higher education. Educators and colleges may carry on their work in a patient, flexible, and understanding way, respecting the interests and ideas of persons, discerning differences in the capacities of individuals or groups, serving the community about it relevantly and responsibly, and infusing its behavior with the higher standards of intellectual and moral integrity. Or the educator and college may show themselves petty, self-righteous, restricted in vision, hypocritical, and rigid. Both kinds exist. If they behave badly, even the most worthy purposes they have will be apt to be polluted, however much they are inscribed in masonry, engraved on letter-heads, or sewn into the banners over the stadium. On the other hand sheer good manners in personal and intellectual encounter will bring some measure of redemption to even the most feeble, the inadequately equipped, or the most technical academic undertaking. In the relations of persons to subject-matters and to one another, the discipline of good behavior is often more telling than the idealism of high purposes. The open, good-humored, constantly self-examining and probing inquirer will bear the marks of a human sensitivity which will be educative in itself. The fearful, rigid, status-seeking, and embittered teacher, despite a high degree of learning, will erect barriers between himself and the creative process of education for human beings and a responsible human culture.

Objectives are not to be separated from methods. The methods employed in education, when it is creative, are methods which have written into them

the ingredients of personal and community life. They are not merely adapted to a mechanical process of filling the mind with a store of learned lumber. They can be creative methods which set the mind free to be continually curious, to seek always to know and understand, and to be critical in seeking out the roots for further learning. But there is something more that can be said about this concern for methods with respect to the role of Christian faith in higher learning. It was stated best in the book by the late Alexander Miller entitled, *Faith and Learning*:

The problem of incorporating the theological ingredient in the scholarly debate which it is the business of the University to conduct is therefore quite different in character from that of incorporating in the curriculum the religious ingredients which are part of the general cultural heritage. For Christian theology, while clearly it has been colored and influenced at every point by the language and the symbolism, the conventions and the social pressures of the societies in which it has lived and done its work, yet in its authentic nature is not a product of culture, but the articulation of Revelation. Like the Church whose voice it is, it is participant in and yet ever critical of every culture, specifically of that complex heritage which it is the business of the University to transmit and improve.

Perhaps the things of pertinence which the theologian may say in the scholarly debate, if they are refocused upon the process of education, may illuminate and enlarge what every specialist and all specialized institutions are devoted to: these things may yet overcome the long, all-too-long, exile which the

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theologian had thrust upon him; and, they may stimulate and set forward the intellectual debate which a university accepts as its first responsibility.

When the human process and the methods by which the truly human is made alive are central to the workings of educational communities, there may be no lessening of ambiguity in educational aims. But the routines, the isolations, the conflicts between fields, the doubt as to whether it will lead to eventual illumination or quiet darkness — all these can be cast within the larger framework which includes the treasured search for reality and truth and freedom, as well as an awareness of the precariousness of human existence. When such a framework is present, perhaps Christian enthusiasm, concern, and content can be poured into more suitable vessels in our educational debates than those which isolate purposes and results as all-important. Some of the issues now subjected to heated discussions from a "religious standpoint" contain only the calculations of practical educators. There are others where the quest for Christian meaning can realistically take place. We can be assured that, where there is a deep humanity of spirit, the Christian cause can be served; processes of teaching and learning may be guided toward the truth about man, the urgency present in his history, and the necessity of a decision for action.

What is demanded is that in all these processes we will not be limited to narrow geographical, ideological, racial or temporal dimensions. Inclusive vision, imagination, and conscience can again become possibilities for men through learning and faith. When they do, then all men in all times and places, with all that they have believed and thought and all that they now hold significant to faith or learning, become academically and ethically relevant.

There are still some cardinal virtues of education — some high purposes — which it may resolve to reach. These come into view when the process gives primary attention to persons and places learning in the service of man's true humanity; these come into view when we genuinely believe that man's history matters. Time alone may be neutral; it will solve some problems, shift others, and create still others. But to understand it under the dimension of history means that we need neither be cynical about life, so that we do nothing, or anxious about it, so that we believe we must constantly do something. What may be expected of history is decision and judgment. In these ways we show our obedience or disobedience. But history itself remains the realm of opportunity and responsibility given to educators for the service of man — which may be sanctified for them as the service of God.

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In Appreciation of Alexander "Lex" Miller

The sudden death May 15, 1960 of "Lex" Miller was not only a great personal loss for a wide circle of friends. It also was a very great loss to the kind of community within which The Christian Scholar has its place. Many of us had learned some of the constituent ideas and the characteristic language which are part of the concern of "faith and learning" from him. Even more, we saw in him the Christian and his call to obedience in the academic world. We shall miss not only his continued contributions to our thought, but also his presence among us and the Christian community in the university. Rather than dwell upon the loss, however, we should like to join his close friend and colleague, Hubert C. Noble, in words of appreciation and gratitude. What follows was first used by Dr. Noble in the "News Notes" from the Commission on Higher Education; we are grateful for his permission to reprint it here.

We had expected many more years of fellowship with "Lex" Miller, more books from his pen, more assistance from his leadership in the cause of a constructive relation between faith and learning. But this was not to be. The Lord to whom he rendered such genuine obedience called him elsewhere. We could dwell upon the loss but would rather express gratitude for being privileged to know, to work with, and to call friend such a choice spirit.

We have known few men for whom Christian faith seemed so genuine, so natural, so central to the purposes for which he lived, yet who carried his faith so lightly and so easily. He made the phrases "Make me captive Lord and then I shall be free," and "The freedom of the Christian man" credible.

We have known few men who could so clearly articulate the meaning of the faith that was in them and for whom the faith made such obvious sense. The rational structure of his faith seemed so clear and obvious to "Lex" that some who did not know him well and were unaware of the complexities of his thought sometimes accused him of dogmatism. Probably more would have had they not been disarmed by the easy, genial manner, the relaxed chuckle, and the obvious respect he had for the opinion of others.

We have known few men who worked so hard, so steadily, and seemingly so effortlessly. We now know that the easy acceptance of the tasks laid upon him was done at a cost and some of us regret that we were not more thoughtful and considerate of one whose strength seemed limitless, with generosity to match. The only excuse is that so often "Lex" was the obvious man to do the job, he did it so well, and demurred so diffidently that we allowed our concerns to silence our concern.

We have known few men with whom we have felt so much at ease, whose acceptance of us seemed so genuine, whose respect came so simply yet was valued so

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highly. Again he made a well-worn phrase credible. The "acceptance" he seemed to feel perhaps accounts for the "acceptance" he gave so freely so that while he stood firmly for his convictions and welcomed the struggle of intellectual encounter, he never gave an impression of rancour or personal animosity. He spoke the truth as he saw it, in love.

Our hearts go out to Jean and David with the prayer that comfort and strength will be given them in difficult days. They and we have lost one who lived the quotation he placed on the fly-leaf of the last book he wrote at the request of the National Student Christian Federation: "To think well is to serve God in the interior court."

The cover artist for this issue is Robert Charles Brown of Uncasville, Conn. The cover Type is Hammer Unziale by Victor Hammer of Lexington, Ky.

Post-Christian Man

SAMUEL H. MILLER

It was E. M. Forster who declared that "we are changing in ways which science does not comprehend and theology dare not contemplate." That phrase "dare not contemplate" suggests a reason for the blindness which exists on all sides to the shifting contours of man's sensibility. Whatever a man's soul may be, the shape of it changes from epoch to epoch. While multitudes see the fashions come and go in hats and houses, very few are aware of the subtle changes wrought in the style of being human.

For over three centuries the world around us and the ideas in which it was articulated have radically changed. The medieval world was scrapped and the super-structure of its myths and metaphysics demolished. We live now in a different universe, and though we may not sense it, we ourselves are different. In the last hundred years, by vast public revolutions and profoundly intimate revelations, the nature of man has been opened up and illumined at depths unknown before. Nietzsche's shrill warnings may have been theatrical at times, but under his dramatic posturings there was insight that man would be superseded by a new type of man. Dostoievski knew with clairvoyant lucidity that Western man, losing Christ, would become another sort of creature. A hundred years ago Carlyle and Blake, Mill and Coleridge were deeply moved by the seismic movement in man's nature. More recently Jaspers, Marcel, and Henry Adams have all defined the changes with sensitive precision. Perhaps the summary of them stands in Hoekendyk's phrase, "the post-Christian" man, whom he believes he perceives appearing in greater numbers in Western civilization.

Silently and quite imperceptibly, man has been disentangled from the Christian world view, set upon his own feet, and given a new vision of a natural universe. Heaven and hell disappeared; God became increasingly unimaginable and rather thoroughly unemployed; miracles were rationalized or evaporated; experience even of the subtlest sort was reduced to natural dimensions. Christianity became an idealistic ethic, the bulwark of respectability, and a convenient source of sanctifying success and prestige. "The seven deadly sins of the medieval world," as Lewis Mumford averred, "became the seven virtues of the modern man."

Just as he shook off the Christian world view, so he hid the fact from his own eyes by disguising his new worldliness with the superficial formalities and

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aspects of the old order. In a sense, the less religious he became, the more successful his "religion" grew. As he eschewed the essential mysteries of faith, he manipulated the institutions of religion with enthusiasm and fervor. While the contemplative skill and sense of the holy vanished, the managerial power in vast bureaucratic organization mounted.

Go Down the List

Whatever it was in man no longer reverberated to the radical nature of the Christian faith. Nowhere is this more evident than in the peculiar dilemma suggested by the Beatitudes. If there is a basic statement of the Christian ethos, it is surely here in this "concentrate" of the Gospel. Yet it is utterly unintelligible in our culture. Try to make sense out of it for any twentieth-century congregation. "Blessed are the poor." Not for us. We simply do not believe it. Go down the list. There is not a single one with which we have any "rapport." We simply do not "reverberate" to the sound of this clarion note of a transcendent experience! Whatever was in us, which might have responded, has been atrophied. We are post-Christian.

There is no doubt of it, we live in a one-level world. Everything is in the same level. There are no degrees of importance; the hierarchy of experience has collapsed. A story about a clown in Munich told by Eric Heller illustrates our confusion: he went about the marketplace measuring everything with a yardstick, and then measuring the yardstick with a second unlike the first. We have no standards.

Life falls apart under such conditions. Religion is the sign of the unchanged, the unconditioned, the ultimate. It is the visible manifestation of the yardstick. Without it, things become all alike, a jumble of more or less, a little better or a little worse, but no great evil or no great good. Tragedy is impossible in a climate like this. Trouble and pain become mere nuisances. Heroism shrinks. Love dwindles to a petty game or inflates itself with romantic fantasy. The post-Christian is at the mercy of everything, unable to measure anything except in its own light and with the fluctuating impulse of his own emotion.

Atomized World

A description of Hemingway's prose by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren illustrate this discrete and atomized world. "The short simple rhythms, the succession of subordinate clauses, the general lack of subordination — all suggest a dislocated and un-unified world. The figures which live in this world live a sort of hand to mouth existence perceptually, and conceptually they hardly live at all. Subordination implies some exercise of discrimination — the sifting of experience through intellect."

The "hand to mouth" existence is common to this post-Christian era. The

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one-level man reduces his world to one level, the simplest level, the level of nature. Even Thoreau would have been shocked if he could hear these "terrible simplifiers" speak of dealing with one world at a time. Indeed they never deal with the world at all; but only with whatever the world drops into their hand at the time.

The second significant aspect of this post-Christian man is the strange newness which has overtaken his Promethean aggression. The modern period has manifested itself in the dominance of all the aggressive impulses of man unleashed in a vast attack on the world. Scientifically he has left no darkness unprobed; industrially he has manipulated every channel of power he has been able to get his hands on. Everywhere he has been the master. Patiently, cunningly, ruthlessly, brilliantly he has dominated the scene. And yet man himself has lost the firm sense of his destiny. He is not merely unsure; he is anxious, full of dread, and incurably restless. He acts like a man driven by guilt, and clutches pathetically at small straws to prop his human venture against the winds of fate. Toynbee puts the matter bluntly: "Nemesis of creativity; idolization of an ephemeral self."

Sudden Realization

The sudden realization of standing at the brink of a yawning abyss is astonishing when one reads through the solid self assurance and even arrogance of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Now that the world has engulfed us, become everything to us, the self has suddenly disappeared. As Sam Beckett bluntly declared, if God disappeared in the nineteenth century, man has vanished in the twentieth. Sartre's doctrine that there is no "human" nature gives sophisticated reflection to the common condition that the human category of being has been replaced by something else. Everywhere we are conscious of our "exile," of "other-directedness," of being "shut up outside ourselves." The "human" is no longer inhabited.

Indeed we seem to be in a frantic flight in all directions away from self. Beatniks in one direction, activists in another. The pain of being human, of standing at the center of the perennial agony of spirit and freedom, of fusing the great contrarieties of experience into a meaningful whole, is desperately avoided.

Such a self exhausts itself on the wheel of the world, and finally drops into its own mystical vacuity. The new passion for Zen and the search for "nothingness" may be a yearning for purgation, but it comes as a natural consequence and reaction to the neurotic activism and surge toward superficial prestige as the wave of totalitarian uniformity came after the rampant individualism of the pre-war years.

One Stands Out

The factors involved in this transformation are many, but one stands out rather starkly. As the post-Christian begins to take shape before our eyes, he bears

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a strange and uncanny resemblance to the machine. Karl Jaspers says that mass man "has been absorbed by the machine." He lives and works, even plays and desires his entertainment, in the forced tempo of the machine. Time tables become the framework of his labor and recreation. He is "organized" along with his children and his home. As for inwardness, there is little left. He has been "externalized," as John Dewey pointed out years ago.

With externalization, the self becomes ephemeral, haunted and hollow. And yet the world does not come off very well in the bargain. At its very peak of power and monopoly over the self, it becomes shadowy, vague, and unreal. Without a substantial self, the world loses a dimension of reality. In our situation today, although the world seems to have won a tremendous victory, it is actually void. The world means nothing once the integrity of the inner life has evaporated. The sum total of our gambit is that by externalizing the self, we have lost the world.

Vast Gulf

Undoubtedly the post-Christian will not have great difficulty in believing himself to have progressed beyond Christianity. This was the burden of both Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's attack. The sincere humanitarian enthusiasm and respectable conformity to the current mores will blind most men to the vast gulf which exists between his comfortable way of life and the gospel enunciated by Jesus in his words and deeds. The post-Christian is merely a person insensible to the "higher dream" of a life lived under transcendent claims or in perspectives of radical mystery. Like Jumbo in Alan Weichert's "Jeromin's Children," he is not hostile to religion, or even concerned. He simply does not raise the religious question at all, not even in church!

Perhaps we are living through one of those severe purgations of the human spirit, such as men have known at intervals in the past, when one world passed away and another was born. Whatever our destiny is in this epoch, nothing less than utmost seriousness seems appropriate. Faith is not what it often appears to be, and unfaith may be the gesture of the profoundest magnitude of man's spirit. To keep our eyes open, our imagination stretched to the utmost, and our mind sharpened to a fine discrimination is surely our hope for threading our way through this age of substance and shadow.

Scholars and Machines

JACOB NEUSNER

Humane scholars are the most unmechanized of men. Long ago they shut the study door to the industrial revolution. Sitting inside with stubby pencil and scratch-sheet, they depend on an antique technology. However the electronic computer now apparently threatens scholars with technological unemployment. With the computer one scholar in a few hours does the work of whole universities of scholars in many years. The computer classifies and compares, organizes, and arranges. It prepares a concordance of a literature or a whole language in a matter of hours. In the past more than one academic reputation was built on a lifetime of patient, semi-technical drudgery of this sort. The computers can even propose emendations to difficult texts and carry out effectively work done today by armies of scholars. They can almost think.

The IBM 705 electronic computer for example prepared a concordance for the Dead Sea Scrolls, transposing the prose into a series of mathematical relationships. The machine was used to analyze the many lacunae in the Scrolls, referring to the words preceding and following a difficult text, and scanning thousands of other words to find those that most nearly fit the context. The accuracy of the machine was tested by blocking out portions of familiar text. It was found that the computer could accurately recover as many as five consecutive words.

This method, first used to compile a concordance to the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, was developed in 1949 by Father Roberto Busa, of the Jesuit College of the Aloisianum in Gallarate, Italy, and an IBM engineer, Paul Tasman. The work on the Scroll concordance, also directed by Father Busa, began at Gallarate where technicians reduced nearly thirty thousand words to IBM cards. A card was punched for each word, giving its location, by line, scroll, column, and sequence, and any distinguishing characteristics. In two hours the cards were converted to two reels of magnetic tape by the IBM 705 computer in New York, and the final alphabetical summary was printed by the machine in Hebrew at about 150 lines a minute.

The IBM 704 Computer is now working on abstracts of scientific and technical articles. The articles are read into the machine, which analyzes them sentence by sentence and selects the significant material for reproduction on an electronic printer. The process, called *Auto Abstracting*, follows preset instructions, for (as the IBM people admit) the computer is presently incapable of intellectual comprehension. It can only treat words as physical entities, determining

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significance by measuring the frequency with which they appear both individually and in various combinations.

The scholars, having come late into the machine age, may well learn from the experience of others. When the camera was invented in the nineteenth century, artists faced technological obsolescence, for it seemed that everything they had achieved with oils and canvas, the camera could do better on film. Portraits, landscapes, indeed the precise representation of reality in every aspect, might be better executed by a mediocre photographer than by the most skillful artist. What was left for the artist but to abandon his oils for photography?

Some indeed did this and demonstrated that the camera too was worthy of great artistry. Others re-examined the proper task for their art and, facing the challenge of photography, abandoned the technical representation of reality for the representation of what man actually sees and the artist truly reproduces. They discovered that art never actually represented reality at all, for the eye sees much more than the canvas contains. They recognized that even the most photographic of artists actually selects and represents a very tentative segment of reality. Exhilarated by this new vision, they explored the infinitely subtle world of color and light; they met for the first time the challenge of formal symbolism; they surrendered to the camera its own, the commonplace view of things, and claimed for themselves what in truth had always been theirs, the impression of their vision and the expression of their souls. Art became in time the expression of self-conscious human vision.

What then is the meaning of the electronic computer for humane letters?

It means, first of all, that some humanists, particularly in philology and text-criticism, will have to master the techniques which make the machine a useful tool for their study. They will have to think through the kinds of work the machine can do best and indeed to discover new uses for it. As the technicians become experienced in preparing concordances and in proposing to the machine certain essentially mathematical problems in text criticism, they may well discover new capabilities for the computer. They will certainly find the machine useful in preparing critical texts of ancient manuscripts.

The technicians will on the other hand also need to determine the computer's limitations. Is technical mastery of the computer even sufficient to prepare a proper concordance? The story of the Biblical concordance raises doubt that machines can provide much more than technical accuracy and mechanical efficiency.

The first concordance, prepared by Rabbi Nathan b. Kalonymus of Arles in Provence in 1437-1445, ought to have sufficed, for it listed all the Biblical uses of the several thousand words in the Hebrew Scriptures. It did indeed provide a basic pattern followed by future workers (and, by the way, was the first Jewish work to accept the division of the Bible into chapter and verse begun by the Vulgate). It

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was republished seven times in the two centuries after the discovery of printing and for the first time in 1523, only three decades after the invention of movable type.

The work of preparing a concordance to the Bible however was by no means complete. R. Isaac Nathan's work was revised by Johannan Buxtorf the Elder of Basel who added different derivative roots, nominal and verbal forms, and rearranged words according to a grammatical scheme. His son added the Aramaic portions. This work itself was revised in the nineteenth century by Julius Furst who published in 1840 a complete revision of Buxtorf's work. He rearranged the words according to his own theory of origin and form of words; Furst held the theory of his pupil, Franz Delitzsch, that Semitic languages are closely connected with Indo-Germanic roots. This theory led deviously to listing the word *Dam* (blood) under the category *Adam* (man). Needless to say, Furst's concordance posed certain difficulties to later scholars. It had the virtue of providing an etymological index, a list of proper names, a list of Phoenicio-Punic proper names, and so on. It was not however exactly the last word on etymology.

When Solomon Mandelkern began to prepare *his* concordance to the Bible, he began by presenting trenchant and compelling criticism of earlier work. He added variants from the Aramaic and Greek translations; he concerned himself with unclear texts, suggesting possible meanings for difficult passages. He rearranged the order in which words were listed. He completed the references which Furst and his predecessors had given only in part. He corrected errors in determining the roots of Hebrew verbs and nouns. He added those words which are used only once in Scripture. Somehow no one earlier thought they mattered. He corrected Furst's grammar. In short he prepared what amounted to a wholly new piece of work.

Mandelkern spent the rest of his life improving his concordance. In 1909 Prof. Sveyn Herner published a "Verbesserung", an improvement, for Mandelkern's concordance. A second edition was published in 1925, incorporating corrections and improvements proposed by many scholars.

The latest Concordance to the Bible, a revised and improved edition of Mandelkern, was published just three years ago. Five centuries have passed, and scholars still do not have a complete, final concordance to the few thousand words of the Bible.

How could the electronic computer have hastened this work? It could have provided greater accuracy (Mandelkern complains of thousands of errors in classification found in earlier concordances). It could perhaps have hastened the actual labor of arranging references. It could have done nothing else, for, as the story of the Biblical concordance indicates, the work depends on the scholars. The scholars have to determine the principles of grammar, of syntax; they have to uncover the mysteries of incomprehensible texts and decide on variant readings.

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The machine is able to grasp the principles of organization and comparison they devise and to generalize these principles throughout a vast body of material. But it also reproduces their errors with dreadful accuracy.

The sensational news about the computer and the Scrolls becomes therefore rather less decisive for humane scholarship. It will certainly no longer suffice for a scholar to make his name through extraordinary persistence. He will no longer have a strong claim to the mind of learning man by competence in comparing variant readings and producing mechanical "text criticism." Remarkable feats of memory are obsolete. The machine remembers better and longer. It holds together facts; used properly, it can create bibliographies and reproduce whatever it is told.

Scholarship is in this way obsolete, if by scholarship one understands formidable efficiency in collecting and classifying everything that is remotely relevant to anything. The question the machine raises is not however what will be the new role for humane letters, for the concordance-story indicates the limitations of the computer. The machine does on the other hand reaffirm the claim of the humanities to tasks which have always been their own: the search for wisdom.

If scholarship means the pursuit of wisdom in a rigorous and rational manner, then scholarship will never become obsolete until clear thinking is out of fashion and men find no more serious questions to ask.

In truth the scholars who need now to watch out that they are not put out of work by machines were never scholars at all, but careerists, the handservants of scholars. They are those who made a profession and a technique out of the obligation of everyone to seek a wise and understanding heart. The genuine scholar finds on the contrary that the new machines bring him a new freedom from drudgery and pedantry, freedom to think and to explore. The scholar is now freer to undertake the responsibilities that were always his. He is now to some extent unburdened of the task of providing the trivial kind of information to be gotten from technical apparatus; within wide limits the machines will, more and more, get this for him. He can recover the sense of purpose in his study that humane learning promises every man, to recover and ponder the memories and wise insights of the mind of man.

Humane letters were once a search for human values. So can they be once again. Humanists were once not professionals, almost exclusively concerned with technical knowledge. Once upon a time, this would have seemed a contradiction to the whole purpose of the study of man. The humane scholar concerned himself with man, what is his wisdom, heritage, and worth. His study was not professional but the obligation of serious amateurs. Humane letters were once an exciting experience. They spoke to the questions of men busy with living. When for example the founders of "Jewish Science" pored over texts, they were intoxicated with the idea that their discoveries were immediately relevant to contemporary

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Judaism. (On this account admittedly they produced some remarkably myopic theories). Humanists once again will find they need to speak on the issues confronting living men. They will draw freely from the wisdom of the past but also from their own insights into the past and into their own times. They need no longer fear that to speak relevantly means to cease to be an authentic scholar.

As humane letters become once again the domain of all who seek after wisdom, technical scholarship in its narrow and contemporary sense will be considered a means toward an intellectual end but not a sufficient purpose. As humane scholars turn their attention once again to human issues, they may well learn from traditional Jewish students of the Talmud. Rigorous and precise, these sages may have come upon esoteric information, but they were never trivial, they never lost their sense of relevance to the perplexities of men. Though they did not seek to solve questions that were immediately pressing and practical, they were always aware that the ultimate issue of their study was life and its meaning and conduct. They pondered in a thousand arguments the tension between revealed truth, as they held it, and human affairs. They concerned themselves with remote issues, but they discovered in them truth for the immediate situation. Beyond and above all else, their study was an act of morality. The rabbis and sages poured their lives into the study of the Talmud. They consecrated themselves and made their souls holy to the cause of the mind.

Yet the rabbis too were men and felt the call to do, to gain power and use it. They resisted mundaneness because their studies were worth their whole being. It was worth their while to do nothing but study Talmud, because the study of Talmud was for them life itself. Thinking was creating. It was doing and making and the achievement of the intellect and — they would say, uniquely — the final worthiness of man.

Machines will, one hopes, bring about such a new vision of the task of humane scholarship: to seek wisdom. They will help man to recover his sense for the austerity and rigor of his intellect. By freeing him from petty tasks that weary his mind, they will probably make triviality obsolete; they will certainly show that the doctoral dissertation commonly demanded represents at best skilled craftsmanship but surely not art.

The machines will certainly not make genius obsolete nor put thinkers out of work. They will help us to see however that thinking is not to be reserved for technicians and professionals. The quality of insight of humane scholarship will be reconsidered, for with the abandoning of technicism and professionalism, humanities lose the claim to positive, compelling truth. Humane letters surely regain however an ancient and mature vision, that scholarship is the search into the very substance of life. Then the humane search for truth becomes, in itself and in its consequences, a statement of being. Then indeed scholars will come to see the truth of the ancient dictum, "If thou hast wrought much in the study of Torah take no credit to thyself, for to this end wast thou created."

Values : Academic and Human

HUSTON SMITH

That human life faces Gargantuan problems in this latter-twentieth century world seems painfully clear. Some of these problems confront humanity as a whole: population, radiation, and how to bring thermonuclear weapons under international control before the world is reduced to radioactive dust. Others confront the West specifically, chief here being the question of how in the face of Communism's advance to preserve political forms in which power is broadly distributed and civil liberties ensured. Individuals, too, are in quandaries. There is a lostness, and anxiousness, a bewilderment in contemporary life which the arts express and statistics — delinquency, divorce, insanity, and alcoholism — confirm.

Reaching for help in every direction, America looks especially to education. Every age and culture expects education to mold uninhibited infants into civilized men, but when times are precarious a free society expects more. It expects social change. For education is democracy's answer to masterminded coercion.

I wish in these pages to ask what the needs of our time indicate for American higher education with respect to one dimension of its endeavor, that of values and their transmission.

I

It lies within the nature of man to want for his children the best he can provide. Some of the provisions he can transmit are material: cleared land to farm, a house to live in, possibly some continuing source of income. But there are other endowments, equally important but less external. These consist of the heritage of knowledge, skills, appreciations, and motivations that keep each generation from having to start the human venture from scratch. And this is where education comes in. For if we ask what over-all function education has served in human history, the answer is: it has been the means by which the adult generation transmits to the oncoming generation the internal equipment it deems necessary for the good life.

For the bulk of human history this transmission occurred informally as mothers in their homes taught their daughters to weave and pound grain and men

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took boys on hunting safaris to impart directly, by demonstration, their ways with fish and game. When societies became complex, schooling was formalized; places and hours were prescribed for learning and designated individuals commissioned to teach. But the widest purpose of education remained unchanged. A case from our own history will bear this out. When the Pilgrims aboard the Mayflower faced the question of authority for the new community they were to establish, they located it in the Bible as construed by all the community's adults. This decision obviously required a citizenry that could read. For the first time universal literacy was felt to be a requisite for the good society and education was summoned to meet this need. All the children in Plymouth Colony were expected to attend school until they could read at least the Bible — 'A' is for Adam, 'B' is for Benjamin, their lessons began. The road from the caves of the Neander Valley to the log school-houses of the Massachusetts Bay Colony is a long one, but the basic function of education does not change. Education remains the means of transmitting to the oncoming generation the internal equipment the adult generation deems indispensable for effective living.

In the past it has always been assumed that this equipment includes values as well as skills. This is obviously true in simple societies: studies of primitive education show that moral instruction is its core.¹ But in civilization, too, education historically has sought to impart values as well as devices. Plato thought the essence of education is the training of character; Aristotle says its aim is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought; John Stuart Mill believed its moral influence to be more important than all others combined; and J. F. Herbart proposed a complete technique whereby instruction might culminate in moral ideas as guides to right action. More recently, when a student approached Benjamin Jowett admitting that he had lost his faith in God, Jowett is said to have thundered back, "You must find him by nine o'clock tomorrow morning or leave this college!" Such attitudes have not been confined to theorists; wherever we look in the past we find education furthering the norms of its culture. On the wave of the nationalism which swept Europe in the late eighteenth century, Prussia built a system of schools designed through stress on history, geography, and the German language to foster feelings of unity and pride in country. And English "public" schools are proverbial in instilling a lifelong ethos or attitude. The 'playing fields of Eton' have borne the brunt of many jests, but they symbolize components in the British character — activism, manliness, and honor — which products like Winston Churchill are forever harking back to. Judging from the

¹Cf. George A. Pettitt, "Primitive Education in North America," University of California Publications in *American Archaeology and Ethnology*, XLIII (1946), 1-182; W. D. Hambly, *Origins of Education Among Primitive Peoples* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1926); Claude Andrew Nichols, *Moral Education among the North American Indians* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1930).

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past, what people really believed has been more clearly revealed in what they have taught their children than in their public professions. As I. L. Kandel has remarked, education was the most Fascist aspect of the Fascist Revolution, the most Communist feature of the Communist Revolution, and the most Nazi expression of the National Socialist Revolution.

II

When we turn to contemporary America we find that almost every statement of objectives for *primary* and *secondary* schools includes moral development in its list. Public schools seem no less interested in such development than parochial ones; certainly those that have been influenced by John Dewey's philosophy put values at the heart of education's endeavor. "Honesty, responsibility, integrity, respect for the individual, the spirit of cooperation, the brotherhood of man," writes a present spokesman for this philosophy, "these are not values that fall in the category of incidental learning, learning that is in a sense a by-product of the main goal. . . . In the reconstructed school they are made central and sought directly."²

Higher education, too, has values to which it is deeply committed and which it seeks wholeheartedly to transmit to its students. But here we begin to close in on the central question for this chapter and the book as a whole. For these values of American higher education are specialized. They do not purport to speak to the range of man's value needs, but to one sector only. Catalogue statements often imply the contrary, but the truth is that with the exception of schools that are genuinely and not just nominally church related, the American college today does not see it as its task to further *human virtues* as a whole. It restricts its responsibility to *intellectual virtues*.

These latter are not incon siderable. They center in an intellectual attitude which can be described, simply, by saying it finds the mind's progressive disclosures of life and the world exciting as well as profitable. It wishes therefore to discover more of life and the world, and to see these more as they are. Though a person possessed of the intellectual attitude knows, with Rilke, that truth can bring terrors that disdain to destroy him, even so, with Plato, he finds truth beautiful.

²I. N. Thut, *The Story of Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957), p. 360. In 1918 a committee of the National Education Association listed worthy home membership, worthy use of leisure, and ethical character as three of the seven normative goals of American high schools. Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education, *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education* (U.S. Bureau of Education, Bulletin 35, 1918).

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Analyzed, this intellectual attitude yields the following specific intellectual virtues as ingredients:

- a. Intellectual honesty; the determination, insofar as possible, to keep personal bias from distorting one's vision of things.
- b. Scope of knowledge. Other things being equal, a rich and varied stock of information renders life more interesting and competent.
- c. Dialectical agility, or "sharpness" as we say. Not only should minds be informed; they should be able to work with their information nimbly, skillfully, and in an orderly fashion.
- d. Aesthetic sensitivity.

These are the values colleges as institutions really believe in.³ In promulgating them, however, teachers find that they entail several other values as supports. Chief among these are diligence, moral honesty, and academic freedom. If students don't work they don't learn. If they cheat on exams or plagiarize, teachers cannot gauge their intellectual position and needs. If teachers cannot teach what, and as, they feel they should, their effectiveness in transmitting the intellectual virtues is curtailed. The consequence is clear. Let students loaf or cheat, let the community try to extend its arm onto the campus to prescribe what may or may not be taught, and teachers can be expected to react. Conduct of these sorts, American college teachers believe, should not be countenanced. Obviously diligence, fair play, and autonomy involve qualities which extend beyond the intellectual virtues proper, yet each is directly related to the intellectual life. If we use the phrase *academic virtues* to include these supporting virtues along with the strictly intellectual ones, we can say that it is this wider category that the American college is concerned to foster, not the intellectual virtues only.

But this is as far as we can go. Public relations statements may profess the college's concern to develop moral character, citizenship, or spiritual growth, and certainly many instructors as individuals conceive their mission partly in these realms. But the general feeling among faculties is that virtues of this sort are not the responsibility of the college as an institution.

Why do they so feel? There seem to be five contributing reasons. Their

³The relation of values to virtues as here used is this: In keeping with its etymology, "virtue" is used to refer to a capacity or power. "Value" designates the quality of things in view of which they are prized. Thus aesthetic sensitivity is a capacity, a power. It is likewise for the college a value, inasmuch as the college thinks it is important. And because men, once they have come to prize a capacity, naturally want to extend not only the capacity itself but the awareness of its importance, colleges desire to transmit not only intellectual virtues but intellectual values. To continue the example of aesthetic sensitivity, they want not only to develop this sensitivity in their students; they also want their students to come to perceive its importance so they will continue to nurture it after they leave the college campus.

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relative weight varies from teacher to teacher, but together they have been enough to induce most teachers to the position just described.

1. The continuing force of the *Enlightenment view of man*. This view held, in essence, that reason is the key to the good life. Free the mind of superstition and ignorance and it will prove capable of discerning the good and persuading the rest of the self to follow it. Those who hold this view are not morally disinterested. They simply believe that the intellectual virtues provide the best leverage for moral growth. Jefferson is their American prototype. Jefferson did not believe that men were naturally wise and good; he had lived through the French revolution and seen it miscarry. But he did believe that three years' schooling made available to every child would produce an electorate capable of recognizing and elevating a true aristocracy to govern them. It was on this faith that the United States established its free schools and enacted compulsory attendance laws.

2. The belief that *all values are relative*. Anthropology's doctrine of cultural relativism, philosophy's emotive theory of value, psychology's discoveries about conditioning, and existentialism's thesis that existence precedes essence have combined to create an impression in the academic mind that values are arbitrary in the sense of there being no universally valid standards by which to judge better from worse.⁴ Such a view reduces the urgency of value instruction, for there is no ultimate respect in which the values to be imparted can be regarded as an improvement on those they replace.

3. *The cult of objectivity*. History and everyday experience are replete with cases in which men's preferences distort their view of the facts. It seems, then, that truth and value are opposed — not in life as a whole we must hasten to say, for there is no thought that life as a whole is possible without values, but while *truth is being sought*. And since the discovery and transmission of truth are education's commission, the less education gets entangled with preferences and emotion and the other soupy concomitants that values always drip with, the better it will be able to perform its appointed task.

4. *Division of labor*. This viewpoint is closely related to the preceding one in that it does not deny the importance of values nor the need for their special nurture: it merely doubts that the place for such nurture is in the college. But whereas the preceding disclaimer arose from the belief that value concerns distort truth, this one holds only that they distract from it. Complex societies are possible only where there is division of institutional function, and in our society home

⁴For a consideration of philosophy's involvement in this situation, see William K. Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, edited by A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958).

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and church look after moral values and the school after intellectual ones. Colleges already have more than they can do working with students' minds. Foist on them the added responsibility of molding students' characters and they will become amorphous blurs doing nothing well.

5. *Respect for autonomy.* From dictatorships to the advertising agency our times are witnessing mass onslaughts upon the individual, all aimed at trying to make him over from the outside into something other than he would have become on his own. Can not one corner of this crowded world be relieved of such pushy aims? Grant that left to shape their own values some students will emerge worse than if they had received more direction. But such casualties are small compared with the loss of freedom, individuality, autonomy, and subjective selfhood which must result from attempts to inject standardized values, however noble, into students by means of behavioral engineering.

There is so much truth in these positions that even if we believed each needed some qualification we might be tempted to say what an English philosopher once said of St. Thomas' proofs for the existence of God: though none is strictly valid in itself, their combined weight is overwhelming. We might, I say, accept this conclusion and leave higher education to its academic values exclusively were it not for one fact. That fact is the present condition of Western Man.

III

For a hundred years now this condition has drawn mounting concern from its most perceptive observers: Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Matthew Arnold, Spengler, Eliot, Marcel and Jaspers, to mention but a few. Diagnoses and prognoses differ widely in detail, but on two points there is concert: the sickness is acute, and its locus is in the realm of values.

Our trouble is most visible when approached politically. The most obvious fact of our time is that the West is locked in a political conflict with survival itself the stake. Two years ago we could face this conflict with assurance: now it seems we must scramble even to match the power that is building up against us, for the comparative acceleration of Communism is sobering. Why? Many reasons contribute, of course, but we err if we think the main one lies in system. Communism's advances do not vindicate its political structure. The source of its vitality lies elsewhere, in the clarity of its objectives, its sense of historic mission, its confidence in its world view. It is conviction in these matters that gives direction to the Communist world and motivates its citizens: *this* is what lies at the heart of its spread, its Sputniks, its 'great leaps forward.' The Russians and Chinese are excited about something to the point of being possessed.

Now men possessed can be more terrible than armies with banners. Possessed of good they are terrible, possessed of evil worse. But what of men unpossessed?

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And is this beginning to look suspiciously like us? More and more it is coming to look as if at best we have something to *disbelieve* in — Communism. But as Whitehead said in a different context, if man cannot live by bread alone, still less can he live by disinfectants. One small but near-conclusive indication of our low collective conviction was the incidence of defection among American prisoners of war in Korea and how little, compared with other nationals, they were willing to sacrifice for one another.* Another is the study by Gillespie and Allport, described in Mr. Bushnell's contribution to the present volume, which finds more self-centered 'privatism' in American college students than in those of other lands. Grant that concerted values are easier to come by in contemporary Communism than in the West because the relevant values for Eastern peoples are still material and national, both of which require less imagination than the values the West now needs, which are spiritual and international. But this is beside the point. The relevant fact is that unless we succeed in firming up a core of values which we as a people believe as fully as the Communists believe in theirs, we stand to lose this struggle and the values of communism will win, not because they will have proven themselves superior to democracy's but because on the level at which this contest will be decided — the level of strong group values — they will have been unopposed.

Purely political considerations, then, force us to ask whether higher education's exclusive attention to intellectual and academic values is adequate. But the matter should not rest here. For though the political argument is a powerful one, in the end it is a poor one. It follows a host of similar arguments we hear: that we should treat Negroes better because if we don't we shall alienate the Afro-Asian people; that we should assist underdeveloped countries because if we don't the Russians will, and so on. Such reasons cannot be ignored, but I should hope they would not be mistaken for the real reasons. The real reason for questioning the colleges' present stance toward values is not that the Communist challenge requires it. The real reason is that life requires it.

The pertinent points, here, are three:

1. Some core and hierarchy of value convictions are needed if men are not to turn their faces to the wall and not bother to get up.

Obviously some of man's choices are wiser than others. To have poor criteria by which to judge is to be headed for trouble; this will be our next point. Here the point is a prior one: to be without *any* criteria by which to decide, to be totally at sea with respect to values, continuously and acutely in doubt as to what is better and worse, is intolerable. Suppose a man to be seated before a panel of ten-thousand buttons of varying shapes and colors. He discovers that some when pressed work harm to him and his companions while others bring them joy. If

*See *The New Yorker*, Vol. 33 (Oct. 26, 1957), pp. 114ff.

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he has to press one each minute, will not his anxiety mount to desperation if he can find no pattern by which to distinguish beneficent buttons from devastating ones? It is life's resemblance to such a setup that leads psychologists to assert the necessity of a firm (which is not to say rigid or unchanging) value structure for human well-being. Eric Fromm says all men need "a frame of orientation and an object of devotion." H. G. Rumke describes unbelief as "a rupture, a disturbing factor in 'normal' development and growth of mind." And William Sheldon writes that "continued observations . . . in clinical psychological practice, lead almost inevitably to the conclusion that deeper and more fundamental than sexuality, deeper than the craving for social power, deeper even than the desire for possessions, there is a still more generalized and more universal craving in the human make-up. It is the *craving for knowledge of the right direction — for orientation.*" It appears that a structure of value convictions is not a plaything for the human animal, a luxury of the intelligentsia. It is the backbone of mental health.

2. If some value structure is essential to man's well-being, it is equally true that certain structures are superior to others. Once this point would have seemed obvious, but relativism has made such inroads on our thinking that I feel obliged to support it. Let me quote, then, Professor A. H. Maslow, Chairman of the Department of Psychology at Brandeis University. After identifying a certain value structure in his contribution to *New Knowledge in Human Values*,⁶ he lists the following "objectively describable and measurable characteristics" to which it is found empirically to lead:

- Clearer, more efficient perception of reality.
- More openness to experience.
- Increased integration, wholeness, and unity of the person.
- Increased spontaneity, expressiveness; full functioning; aliveness.
- A real self; a firm identity, autonomy; uniqueness.
- Increased objectivity, detachment, transcendence of self.
- Recovery of creativeness.
- Ability to fuse concreteness and abstractness, primary and secondary process cognition, etc.
- Democratic character structure.
- Ability to love.

These objective consequences are paralleled by subjective reactions, "also susceptible of research exploration." They include "feelings of zest in living, of happiness or euphoria, of serenity, of joy, of calmness, of responsibility, of confidence in one's ability to handle stresses, anxieties, and problems." The

⁶A. H. Maslow (ed.), (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), pp. 119-36.

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subjective signs of living by values the reverse of those he describes "are such feelings as anxiety, despair, boredom, inability to enjoy, intrinsic guilt, intrinsic shame, aimlessness, feelings of emptiness, of lack of identity, etc."¹

I have deliberately avoided describing the value structure Mr. Maslow says leads to the consequences he cites because I don't want to confuse the present point. That point is not *which* values are best; it is only that *some* are better than others for the human situation in general.

3. If it is important that men have values, if it is important that they have certain values rather than others, it is equally important that these values pervade the culture as a whole. For it is nonsense to picture man's position as essentially one in which he works out his own concepts of worth. Every individual will introduce personal touches, and occasional Abrahams will return their swords after raising them to sacrifice their sons, changing significantly thereby the mores of their times. But to rate as high either the amount the average person deviates from his culture's values or the number of persons who deviate significantly, is hopelessly to misunderstand the ways of man.

Overwhelmingly men and women derive their values from their culture. In Suzanne Langer's apt phrase, a culture is a "virtual world" which people build up over the ages by their beliefs, their criteria of credibility, their expectations and assumptions, and their patterns of conduct and relationships. In traditional societies men and women derive from their culture an awareness of what they are expected to do and not to do, what is required, permitted, and prohibited. They may not always live up to these prescriptions, but they are rarely in doubt as to where the "ought" lies. In contrast, our conglomerate, mobile, and fast-changing society has perfected what Gilbert Murray called "techniques of habit breaking." There is no nostalgia here for traditional societies; they have a closure, an oblivion which can stifle man's spirit however well they hold it intact. But is the alternative to a caged culture no culture at all? Industrial cultures must allow more freedom, more autonomy, more room for privacy and imagination than traditional ones. But unless there is a foundation of ideas and conceptions, of selective awareness and sensibilities, of ways of thinking, believing, acting, and feeling that a people hold and celebrate in common — in short, unless there is at least a skeleton of accepted outlook into which the oncoming generation can be acculturated, a society is in deep trouble.²

We have outgrown the exaggeratedly individualistic approach to physical welfare, altogether with regard to health and to an appreciable extent in economics. No one doubts that health is a communal problem, that unless there is collective responsibility for sanitation, water-purification, quarantine, and at times inocula-

¹*Ibid.*, p. 127.

²For a perceptive elaboration of this point, see Lawrence K. Frank, "The School as Agent for Cultural Renewal," *The Burton Lecture* (Harvard University Press, 1959).

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tion, the individual is helpless. Any teacher who championed letting students work out their own health conditions would feel a bit foolish; we even compel Christian Scientists to take physical examinations. Yet somehow when we turn to other values, their social character drops from sight. The individual student suddenly becomes omnicompetent, and *laissez faire* and rugged individualism carry the day. Alas, the truth lies far from such notions. Basic, deep-lying values are closer to the air we breathe and the water we drink than the artifacts we privately create. Let water become polluted, or air, and individuals are defenseless.

IV

Not only Communism, then, but life as we are coming to understand it forces us to re-examine the college's current waiver of values beyond its direct concerns. Specifically it requires that we look again at the five reasons that currently persuade teachers to restrict their concerns to academic values to see if, in the face of our needs, they still appear sufficient.

1. The Enlightenment view maintains that reason is an adequate guide to the good life. The strongest currents of twentieth century thought, even academic thought, challenge this hypothesis. Freudians see reason under the sway of the id, Marxists as under the sway of class interest, theologians as under the sway of sin, existentialists as without objective norms to latch onto even if these sways were relieved. Kierkegaard puts the matter vividly. People live their lives in three ways, he says, aesthetically (i.e., as spectators), ethically, or religiously. Let us imagine all the facts in the world stacked ceiling-high at the front of a classroom. Give a teacher power to shovel all those facts into the minds of his students and how would they live thenceforth? Says Kierkegaard, some would live aesthetically, some ethically, and some religiously.

No one is saying that reason is irrelevant to the good life. But (a) can it, unaided, spot which values are right? In other words, are values objectively demonstrable? If so, (b) is reason's control over most men's lives sufficient to dispose them to follow the goals it indicates in the face of temptations to the contrary? Rephrasing this second question in classic form, is to know the good to do it? On the whole evidence seems to incline us to answer both these questions in the negative. "It is one of the paradoxes of our times," says Justice Jackson of the Supreme Court, "that modern society needs to fear only *educated* men." (Italics mine.)

2. *Value relativism.* How many students have concluded from this phrase

"Socrates held that we always do what we think right. . . . But most subsequent moral philosophy has doubted the 'Socratic paradox.'" William K. Frankena. "Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education," *Harvard Educational Review* (Vol. XXVIII, No. 4), p. 302.

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which floats so freely over college campuses that one thing is as good as another? Yet is this what the best contemporary knowledge suggests?

The considerations students think point this way come from three disciplines: anthropology, philosophy, and psychology.

Anthropologists speak of culture relativism. It is an unnoticed fact that this phrase was not originally coined to stress what students usually derive from it — that values vary from culture to culture. What the anthropologists were concerned to point out was the way each item within a culture draws its meaning from its relation to the culture as a whole. The original accent of the phrase was integral rather than comparative; it asked us to attend not so much to differences between cultures as to the wholeness, the personality we might say, of each considered in itself. It is true that this beginning led on to interest in differences; with Westermarck's two books cultural relativism became ethical relativism. When, having come to understand the cultures individually, anthropologists began to compare them, the thing that jumped out at them was their variety. But this is not where the study has come to rest. Sifting these remarkable differences — knowledge of which, by the way, is one of the most valuable contributions of college, being the best possible antidote to provincialism — anthropologists seem now to be uncovering a small but significant core of universals. "There is growing tendency . . . for anthropologists to [try] to find out what moral principles are universal because universal conditions of human living give rise to them," says Robert Redfield, adding, "I am persuaded that cultural relativism is in for some difficult times."¹⁰ "We can expect both a generic similarity of values and a considerable degree of variability among cultures," writes Professor Kroeber. "The problem of how far values are relative and variable or universal and permanent . . . will not be answered in terms of zero or a hundred percent. The answer will presumably be somewhere in between."¹¹ William L. Thomas concurs: "We do not have to flop from the absolutism of ethnocentricity to the equally absolute paralysis of relativism blown up into a total negation."¹² At Yale University the records of a few hundred societies have been gone over to find what seems always to occur in human living. The rough analysis has yielded at least seventy-five "elements common to all known cultures."¹³ Dorothy Lee tells us that "the good is held to be social in all or nearly all societies," and quotes Clyde Kluckhohn to the effect that "there is in all societies an interdiction against

¹⁰*The Primitive World and Its Transformation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953), pp. 142, 145.

¹¹In Sol Tax et al, *An Appraisal of Anthropology Today* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 375-376.

¹²*Yearbook of Anthropology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 259-60.

¹³George Peter Murdock, "The Common Denominator of Cultures," in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed. by Ralph Linton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945) p. 124.

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'killing, indiscriminate lying and stealing within the ingroup,' and in fact, against whatever might bring about dissension, disruption, destruction within the recognized social unit, thus insuring the persistence of good relations."¹⁴

If frontier work in anthropology does not point to unqualified value relativism, the same can be said of psychology and philosophy. From psychology, especially its experimental wing, students frequently derive the impression that man is determined; from philosophy, that value statements can do no more than express the emotional states of those who assert them.¹⁵ But do these notions represent the preponderant weight of frontier thinking in these fields? It would take us too far afield to go into this question thoroughly, and the answer would not be unequivocal in any case. But it is conservative to say that at least a balance of first-rate psychologists now recognize determinism as an important methodological hypothesis rather than a proven fact, and that in philosophy the positivistic contention that value is irrational and what is rational is not value but fact is on the defensive.

3. *The cult of objectivity.* Understood positively as the determination to keep personal bias from distorting truth, objectivity is invaluable to the intellectual quest. Transposed to this context, Spinoza's famous motto, *nec ridere, nec lugere, sed intelligere* — not laughing, nor complaining, but understanding — has something to say to every teacher.

But teachers can also become hypnotized by words like objectivity and subjectivity, and one gets the impression this often happens. Surely it has happened when it is supposed that values necessarily distort. Some fields require empathy and allied qualities for understanding. Péguy tells us the true historian should be not *désintéressé* but *passionné*. And Robert Redfield says that despite what they say, anthropologists not only "do in fact place values of their own on what they see" but should do so, "for I think that this valuing, guarded by all the objectivity and scientific procedure they can muster, is a necessary part of their work."¹⁶

Even where values are not essential to vision, however, and can obstruct it, they need not do so. It is simply not true that teachers who have the weakest commitments see things clearest. All of us have known men who believed things with all their hearts yet were scrupulous about negative evidence, who held positions both firmly and critically and were epitomes of reflective commitment. What education needs is neither teachers without commitments nor ones who try

¹⁴In A. H. Maslow (ed.), *New Knowledge of Human Values* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 166.

¹⁵In the opening pages of *The Abolition of Man* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947) C. S. Lewis gives a vivid description of how students get this impression from contemporary philosophy. The remainder of the book shows how the impression points logically to the abolition of man.

¹⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 157.

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to check their commitments when they step onto the campus. It needs teachers who have the sense to see where convictions are likely to refract the truth and will take pains in such cases to try to compensate for their refraction.

4. *Division of labor.* To those who propose that schools attend to ideas and home, church, and fraternities look after values, we can do no better than quote several sentences from a recent article by Professor William Earle of Northwestern University titled "Notes on the Disintegration of Culture." Professor Earle points out that to be healthy a culture must be whole. Concern, lucidity and expression are required, and

functioning together, they create culture. But when they . . . desire to become distinct activities, professionalized, and definable in themselves, we arrive at the contemporary scene: *concern* becomes the special province of "religion"; *lucidity* becomes the special province of "science" and "philosophy"; *expression* becomes the specialty of the "arts." And, in a nutshell, this is our own diagnosis [of the sickness of our culture]. What now passes for "philosophy" is not and does not aspire to be a lucidity of the spirit. It is "technical," that is, pure knowledge devoid of any interest in the concerns of the spirit. What passes for religion is an "ultimate concern" which is not and cannot be made lucid by philosophy or science. And what passes for art, is something thought to be pure expression, with no content and above all no "message." The net result is that in aspiring toward absolute purity, toward independence, and toward the technical, these activities which might be the supreme expressions of the human spirit have achieved absolute triviality.¹⁷

If to be concerned for values and their transmission requires that teachers must subtract time and attention from subject matter, the "division of labor" plea might stand in spite of the argument which this quotation presents. But does it require this? Does an art historian's sense of the priceless visual heritage of Western man poach upon his lecture time? Does "teaching economics with a sense of the infinite and the urgent," to use Patric Malin's phrase, steal from class discussion? I can only report that the teachers who did most for my values did most for my understanding as well. For it was not as if their concern foreshortened their learning; it infused it with blood and sap — the trees of knowledge and life growing together. As we come to think of it, there seems to be something like an inbuilt protection *against* values detracting from subject matter, for to the extent that teachers go out of their way for values, simply dragging them in, they moralize and preach, and such devices never succeed. They boomerang.

¹⁷*Noonday I* (New York: Noonday Press, 1958), pp. 5-6.

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5. *Respect for the student's autonomy.* This is certainly a valid ideal. But what does it entail? Obviously it cannot mean that we should try not to influence students at all. Where then is the line between legitimate influence and indoctrination?

The point of division can only be in terms of the worth of the influence to the student himself. If the values conveyed increase the student's usefulness to the teacher, the economy, or the state primarily, and if (as is almost necessary where ulterior motives dominate) free discussion is restricted and relevant data proscribed, the student has been indoctrinated. But if there really are values which are indispensable to the well-being of the student himself, his autonomy will be infringed if these are denied, not if they are supplied. Not to care about imparting such values is not to care about students.

Ultimately the belief that influencing students' values is indoctrination whereas influencing their knowledge is not roots back into the Enlightenment outlook we have already discussed. So let us return to this matter a final time to try to see what the real issue here is. This time we shall use a comparison with science to bring the issue to focus.

People commonly suppose that scientific laws are generalizations from direct experience. But philosophers of science tell us that this is so much an oversimplification that it is misleading. Consider several random observations of motion: a sheet of paper fluttering toward the floor, an apple plummeting to the ground, the trajectory of a bullet, the orbits of heavenly bodies. Are we to think that from behaviors as diverse and apparently unrelated as these Newton could have abstracted his laws of motion? It is impossible. Newton's actual procedure came nearer to being the opposite. He did not measure movements of all manner of things and then distill their common features. Instead he hit upon a formula for F , he assumed a postulate. From this he deduced certain theorems that followed logically. And finally, from these he was able to make some predictions which could be checked against observations.

The Enlightenment View parallels in ethics the man in the street's oversimplified view of the relation between laws and observations in science. Enlightenment philosophers believed, and their spiritual descendants still believe, that an uncontaminated reason looking out on the world of human doings and consequences would perceive without much difficulty how sensible men should behave. The perception might not even prove difficult. Voltaire wrote: "It has taken centuries to learn a part of nature's laws, but one day was sufficient for a wise man to learn the duties of man."¹⁸ Unfortunately the situation is not this simple. Evil men prosper; the wicked flourish like the green bay tree, and the good die young, often enough at least to make such sayings proverbial. What

¹⁸Quoted in Vergilius Ferm (ed.), *A History of Philosophical Systems* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 268.

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empirical facts could one hope to find that would persuade a horse trader always to give his customers a square deal?

The truth is that if this is a moral universe it is not so obviously one that a college student is likely to discern the fact singlehandedly any more than he would be likely to stumble on Newton's laws. The parallel is exact: from a reasonably clear-eyed but uninclined observation of the moral scene he would be likely to conclude almost nothing. But let him get hold of a postulate; let him be brought to the conviction, for example, that "he that seeketh his life shall lose it" and — here is the difference between theoretical and practical reason — let him work his life into such a postulate and begin living according to it, and behold, the facts of experience will confirm it, even as they do Newton's laws.

The point for the present discussion is clear. If this précis of the moral situation is correct, to help students toward moral postulates, not just toward seeing them but toward living by them, is as essential for their discovery of moral truth as scientific laws are for their comprehension of nature. Great moralists have recognized this for a long time. It is why Plato says a pupil should be educated in poetry and music, for then "when reason comes, he will greet her as a friend."¹⁹ It is why Aristotle says that only pupils trained in "ordinate affections" will be able to perceive the first principles of ethics.²⁰

There is one other point on this matter of autonomy and indoctrination. Teachers may hesitate to influence student values, but there are other agents in society that have no trace of their squeamishness. Television, advertisements, propaganda dispensers in the true and dangerous sense of that word din in our students' brainpans from morning to night. No wonder we retreat, determined to have no part of such exploitation. But if true values do exist, not to help our students discover them is to leave them prey to false ones.

V

I have tried to set the stage for the chapters that follow by arguing that colleges ought not to restrict their value concerns to academic virtues. In doing so I have written things so obvious that I am almost ashamed to have set them down. But the temper of colleges today appeared to point so largely in the opposite direction that the matter seemed to need to be argued out.

Here this essay could end. But I want to mention three great questions that follow if the thesis that has been stated is accepted. I can be brief because in one way or another each of the contributions to this book speaks to one or more of these questions.

¹⁹*The Republic*, 402a.

²⁰*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095b.

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If there are values other than the academic toward which the college should assume responsibility, (1) what are they, (2) can they be transmitted, and (3) if so, how?

First, what are they? Despite all our talk about the relativity of values, I doubt that there is much disagreement on this question. Part of this feeling springs from personal involvement in an experience in which eighteen college professors representing the full spectrum of contemporary philosophical positions found themselves in astonishing agreement when they settled down to think the question through together.²¹ It is re-enforced by the most recent symposium on values that has come to my attention, *New Knowledge in Human Values*, edited by A. H. Maslow. The participants in this symposium, including some of the finest minds in America, differ sharply on value sanctions and their metaphysical status. But as to which values are most worthy, there is no dispute. Who really disagrees with Aldous Huxley when in his chapter on education in *Brave New World* he speaks of the need for a set of generally accepted values based on fact and comes up with the following:

The value first of all, of individual freedom, based upon the facts of human diversity and genetic uniqueness; the value of charity and compassion, based upon the old familiar fact, lately rediscovered by modern psychiatry — the fact that, whatever their mental and physical diversity, love is as necessary to human beings as food and shelter; and finally the value of intelligence, without which love is impotent and freedom unattainable.

This statement does not close the question. There are other important values, and the ones Mr. Huxley lists need to be sharpened up. But I am not concerned here to carry the question further. Let me say only that I do not see this question as the difficult one.

The next question — can values be taught? — is more vexing. Here for the first time in the discussion one is tempted to give up. Life's opening years are so important for the structuring of personality that it may be doubted whether anything important in value redirection can occur thereafter. And yet things do happen. I shall not trespass on Mr. Bushnell's statement that follows beyond saying that apparently Philip Jacob's sobering conclusions on this point require modification, or at least careful interpretation.²² In any case, Mr. Jacob's study

²¹See Huston Smith, *The Purposes of Higher Education* (New York: Harper & Brother, 1955).

²²For two important interpretative studies, see John E. Smith, *Value Convictions and Higher Education* and Allen H. Barton, *Studying the Effects of College Education* (New Haven: The Hazen Foundation, 1959 for both).

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describes the college scene today which, as we have seen, is really concerned only with academic values.

Finally, *how* should values be taught? The following chapter contains a description of a number of courses in a variety of disciplines that seek to help students discover where the good lies. This is a good half of the problem, the Socratic half. But beyond seeing the good is doing it; beyond Socrates' problem is St. Paul's.

We are not entirely in the dark as to how students might be helped with this latter problem. We know that example and habituation are crucial, and above all a campus ethos, a 'style of life' embodying judgments, implicit and expressed, as to what a given community of scholars considers appropriate. This does not mean that men who do not individually exemplify the total ethos should be barred from the faculty. A Gully Jimson straight from *The Horse's Mouth* may be so completely obsessed with aesthetic form that moral awareness is all but crowded out. Yet (assuming a certain minimal morality) his contribution to the college's total thrust might more than compensate for this general moral lack. But the lack is nevertheless real and needs to be compensated for. This means that the number of amoral professors a college can tolerate is limited. Their number must not be enough to prevent the campus ethos from having a firm moral dimension in addition to others.

But these are mainly topics for another day, another study.²³ The pages that follow deal with the logically prior, more strictly intellectual part of the problem. If the reader shares my reaction, he will find that they deal with a controversial and fascinating set of issues. I need hardly add that they are a crucial set. For Plato put the matter well: "We are at issue about matters which to know is honorable and not to know disgraceful; to know or not to know happiness and misery — that is the chief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this?"²⁴

²³Edward D. Eddy, Jr., *The College Influence on Student Character* (Washington: American Council on Education, 1959) appeared as these lines were being written.

²⁴*Gorgias*.

Theological Tensions in the Academic Community

CHARLES S. MCCOY

The reflections on theology and the university which follow grow out of a problem raised by a Seminary Intern on a college campus this past year. He wanted to know how we can deal constructively with the clash of presuppositions in the academic community. While this is not the entire problem Christians face on the campus by any means, it certainly is one of the crucial issues in any campus Christian life program which takes the university seriously. If Martin Buber is correct that "life is meeting," then we may sometimes get the impression in the university community that because of differing presuppositions, different points of view, persons who see each other, who pass each other every day, never really meet each other, never really communicate with one another.

This clash of presuppositions and differing viewpoints in terms of which person fails to meet person in the academic community can not be taken lightly. As we see representatives of different disciplines speaking from their own perspectives with little or no reference to the truths that may be found in other areas of knowledge, as we see department head or college dean struggling for power with their counterparts without reference to some over-arching vision of truth, we may be reminded of the words of Matthew Arnold, "And we are here as on a darkling plain, swept by confused alarms of struggle and flight, where ignorant armies clash by night." As we ponder the meaning of Martin Buber's words, we may be struck with the tragic aspects of our isolation from one another. We are strangers, as Thomas Wolfe has reminded us in this haunting passage: "Naked and alone we came into exile. In her dark womb we did not know our mother's face. From the prison of her flesh have we come into the unspeakable and incommunicable prison of this earth. Which of us has known his brother? Which of us has looked into his father's heart? Which of us has not remained forever prison pent? Which of us is not forever a stranger and alone?"

No Christian who seeks to be responsible to God in the academic community can afford to ignore this problem of clashing presuppositions, of different points of view around him. It may be evaded only by pretending that the problem does not exist or by attempting to gloss over it with easy answers and false solutions.

A recent article entitled "The Car Detroit Should Be Building" makes

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a shrewd observation about the automobile manufacturers, but it might also apply to many of our churches and to American "religion in general." The auto industry, the article suggests, thinks that the way to "improve" its cars is by better styling. "Detroit's reliance on the stylist," the author charges, "is based on the perverse notion that the way to care for a sick man is to call in a tailor. Don't fret about his organic ills, just buy him a new suit. He'll look better." Many of our church programs unhappily suffer from a similar misdirected zeal. We attempt to provide people with a relaxed smile and a happy glow rather than seeking to diagnose man's deep illness and to open the way for a real cure. Our methods may make him look better temporarily but lead to no real meeting of mankind with Jesus Christ. All too often we of the Church appear as morticians of the soul — doing no more than preparing the dead for a decent and beautiful burial.

For real solutions, however partial, we must probe further. Let us look first at the setting of the problem posed by the clash of viewpoints and faiths within the academic community and then see what light our Christian faith may throw upon the task of responsible Christians in this community.

Over the past several centuries a process has been at work within the university which has led in the twentieth century to considerable compartmentalization of the various disciplines of knowledge. One way to state this is that there has occurred a loss of the hierarchical structure of knowledge which was present within the mediaeval university. Now I think it is quite possible for us to exaggerate the extent to which knowledge was unified within the academic community even of the thirteenth century. It was said then that theology was queen of the sciences. At times this might have been true, but I suspect that theology as queen of the sciences was more an ideal of the theologians than a reality.

Even so there was a norm of unity among the various disciplines though it was perhaps never realized in actuality. Since that time however we have witnessed two processes at work. One is the process of secularization and the other is the process of specialization within the various disciplines of the academic community. These may be regarded as two aspects of a single movement by which Western learning broke the grip of mediaeval theology upon all pursuit of truth and achieved for the various branches of knowledge an independence which was hard-won. Actually secularization and specialization go together. They can not be separated, for to specialize without the framework of traditional theology means ultimately secularization whether intended or not; and to reject the unifying context of Christian faith, that is to become more secular, leads inevitably to a viewing of each discipline as a separate specialty. Yet while they go together, secularization and specialization must not be identified. Important differences exist between them. The process of secularization has grown out of a hostility to Christian theology. It has meant a conscious discarding of the Christian framework into which all knowledge may be seen as fitting. Secularism implies rejection of

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Christian faith. This has often been a part of the university community in the Western world, yet it is not the only thing that has led to a separation of disciplines. At least as important is the process of specialization. By specialization, we mean the increasing tendency of those who research in each department of knowledge to investigate their own area without reference to other academic concerns, without a comparison either of premises or results. No more than limited values, applicable within each discipline, are discussed explicitly. Consideration of ultimate presuppositions and commitments is rejected or ignored, and thus these final norms remain only in implicit, unexamined form.

Both secularism and specialization are important in coming to an understanding of the contemporary university scene. Some of the compartmentalization of the university arises from hostility to Christian faith. Perhaps even more important is the compartmentalization which has resulted from specialization in which an over-arching framework of faith has been inadvertently disregarded rather than consciously rejected. The distinction is certainly important in the way we approach different people on the campus. We know well the type who is hostile to Christian faith. Probably a more significant segment of the campus, especially among the faculty, involves those who fall in the category of the specialist. They may be good church members, perhaps even singing in the local choir, yet their life in the classroom and the laboratory is completely separated from their Sunday life in church. They are not hostile to the Christian faith in their discipline; they have never really related learning to Christian convictions or to ultimate commitments of any variety. Whatever the origins and whatever the process by which the interrelation of knowledge has disappeared in the modern university, intellectual compartmentalization has resulted in the academic community.

The word "fragmentation" is a popular term today in speaking of the "university question"; I would suggest that it is too strong. Perhaps the German theological influence on our thought has led us to exaggeration in this regard as well as in others. Many partial unities remain in the university. We certainly see deans and department heads exhibiting interest in a framework of power in which all participate. The entire faculty may share some community of interest when the budget is before the legislature or when a great appeal is being made to the alumni for funds. There is even a sort of unified structure in the segmented intellectual life of the university in which all agree that they will stay in their compartments and not disturb the pursuit of truth that others may be carrying out in their own disciplines.

What we see clearly in the contemporary academic community is a general abdication of responsibility for the ultimate loyalties of those who make up the permanent part of the community or of responsibility for the ultimate loyalties of the students. We see also unexamined adherence to the cult of objectivity, the

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belief that somehow our pursuit of learning can be sterilized of all bias, of all subjectivity, of all presuppositions. Or to put it another way, we see on the campus competing "minor religions," with people of many secular faiths seeking to convert students to their own point of view about the world.

Rather than speaking of fragmentation, perhaps this scene could better be described as a "*laissez-faire*" pattern in the pursuit of truth. Within this system all chase their own particular interests. The student in order to get his degree is forced to clear separate and unrelated academic hurdles; and all of this is done in the calm assurance that an Invisible Hand will somehow produce in this process "educated men." One of the brightest aspects of American higher education today is an increasing dissatisfaction with this "*laissez-faire*" pattern of education. It is now being widely questioned that this compartmentalized, free-enterprise gathering of information, added together and passed on to students in separate clumps, will produce educated persons.

With the happy optimism of this Smithian-type education shattered, the chaplain, the Christian professor, the Church, or the Faculty Christian Fellowship may become for many the focus of probing brought on by this development and may contribute creatively to the tension consequent upon the questing into the meaning of education in the modern world. The reason Christians may play an important role is two-fold. First, Christian faith often makes one painfully aware of the problem of compartmentalization among the various disciplines and within the lives of faculty and students. Second, theology is the area into which the problem of relating and unifying the various compartments of knowledge inescapably leads us.

Yet to relate theology to academic disciplines raises problems which we can not evade. We must be clear about one thing. Theology is not the queen of the sciences, jealously guarding her prerogatives to adjudicate among the branches of knowledge and claiming the right to define the limits of truth. We do not wish to return to the Middle Ages and its ideals as regards the connection between theology and the various disciplines of the university faculty. Can a new relationship between theology and other areas of knowledge be established? Informed and devoted Christian scholars, whether chaplains or professors, may occupy key roles in answering this question and in returning theology to a productive position in the academic community.

The first step in this process is to make it clear that the relationship which we would like to establish is not a relationship of control. Because of the past stretching back into the Middle Ages, talking theology often arouses the suspicion that one wishes to make it autocrat of learning once again. We of Protestant Christian faith share the desire that the various disciplines of the university be independent of theological control. We have often fought alongside the secularist to obtain and keep academic freedom. We view with satisfaction the historic

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struggle by which the pursuit of learning gained its independence of ecclesiastical dogma. As we seek to return theology to its place in our university life, our interest in academic freedom must be communicated. If it is not a relationship of control that we wish to return to, what relationship between theology and the various branches of knowledge do we seek? Here we meet the main issue.

If I have a thesis around which these reflections are centered, it is this: The role of theology in the contemporary academic community is not that of control but of conversation. This means, first, illuminating the presuppositions of our intellectual life together, that is, examining the foundations upon which the knowledge of different disciplines rests; second, creating a context by means of this process of illumination in which interdisciplinary communication can take place; and third, enabling real unities to emerge without coercion and clarifying the areas where disagreement remains. This thesis offers a platform upon which Christian theology may be made relevant to the academic scene within the framework of academic freedom.

As you will quickly recognize however, this is not really a solution. It poses the problem more sharply. And the terms in which it is posed create for Christians a seemingly impossible task because theology is an impossible notion in the Western Christian tradition. There is a contradiction inherent in the very word itself and the contradiction inherent in theology is characteristic of our Western religious thought. What is theology? The answer can only be given by reference to the two main sources of the Western tradition of faith. For the Greeks theology means knowledge about God. As defined quite carefully by Aristotle, theology refers to that intellectual discipline which examines the presuppositions of all other bodies of knowledge; it examines the intellectual foundations of all other sciences. It may be called first philosophy as well as theology. In the Hebrew tradition however theology has a quite different meaning. In the Biblical sense theology is speech about the unknown Creator-Redeemer, he who is hidden in mystery yet who is the ground of being of all that is. God can not become known by any human effort. He becomes known to man only as he reveals himself, that is, through revelation. He is the source of all that is, yet is not himself identified with his creation. He is "I am who I am." These two quite different understandings of theology are inescapable in our Western Christian heritage and there is a chasm between them. In the work of Paul Tillich and Nikolai Berdyaev we see a masterful wrestling with the full implications of both sides of the dilemma created by the alternative meanings of theology. On the one hand there is the depth of being in all of its mystery, and on the other hand there is the necessity of the human mind to seek coherence in experience. As H. Richard Niebuhr puts it, the Christian seeks "logos in *mythos*, reason in history."

In the academic community therefore theology points first to the intellectual

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presuppositions of every discipline and every system of thought, and second to what Tillich calls the ground of ultimate concern and others prefer to designate as the final place of the heart's trust, the ultimate object of human loyalty. In our work as Christians in the academic community we must keep both of these meanings of theology in mind but we must not confuse them. No sharp line, of course, can be drawn between them as we see them illustrated in the persons around us. What a person presupposes in his academic thinking may not be identical with the ultimate commitments of faith by which he lives his daily life. While we recognize this, we must also remember that we are not able as humans to distinguish finally between intellectual notions and living commitments.

In another way this dual meaning of theology points to the double struggle that constantly goes on within the Christian — on the one hand the struggle with our Lord, and on the other hand the struggle with the world around us. This dual meaning illuminates also our meeting with persons in the university. Quite often we meet them apparently on intellectual ground. We are discussing ideas. We are comparing ideologies. We seek to understand their presuppositions as well as to be clear about our own. Yet for Christians this intellectual level of discourse is not enough. We seek at last not only to point out intellectual foundations, that is, to "understand" one another. We seek to be used of God to illumine the way for other persons toward faith and trust in him. How can we deal responsibly with clashing presuppositions and differing faiths within the university in terms of this setting and this posing of the problem?

First, I think it needs to be said that we can not deal with it on the level of programming, by adding a new discussion group or increasing church visitation. Instead, an understanding of this problem must underlie and inform all of our programs, all of our counselling, all of our scholarship. Indeed it must inform and govern our response in all meeting of person with person in the academic community.

Second, it does not mean that we must be educated as experts in every discipline of the university. It is not necessary that we know every branch of knowledge in detail in order to raise questions about what are the presuppositions of various disciplines and to join in discussion of what these might be. What is required is that we be prepared to probe into the depth of every area of learning in company with other members of the university community. It means taking the university seriously in its pursuit of learning, yet not feeling that we must be omniscient in order to converse. In openness we seek to learn whom we are speaking to and seek to learn from him, not with the thought that we shall eventually know everything, but in the conviction that all learning is of God and that this person is a child of God.

Third, there seem to be some general approaches, the enumeration of which may be helpful. Inter-disciplinary discussions conducted on the level of faculty, graduate students, or undergraduates may prove revealing to the participants as to

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the different principles on which their particular branches of learning are based and may lead to some insight into the problem of an over-arching framework of truth into which all knowledge fits. Discussions in which persons of a particular vocation participate may also be productive. A group of law students and faculty may find it fruitful to explore the relationship of Christianity and law and the possible meanings of law itself in terms of our total culture. Education majors may learn from probing together into the depth of the meaning of education. Students of literature may find meaning for their own lives through an examination of the ultimate questions raised in contemporary plays and novels. In such activities we can be reminded that the ministry of the Church is not from clergy to laity but is among and between all Christians through *the Christian, Jesus Christ*.

Still a fourth area of concern is that of helping compartmentalized individuals relate the various segments of their lives into a meaningful whole. This need may exist as often among faculty members as among students. Indeed, wherever we aid persons to take seriously their vocation as students before God, wherever we help persons into an understanding of themselves and their disciplines in relation to a larger whole of university, of culture, and of God's creation we have in some measure carried out our responsibility as Christians in the academic community.

Finally it appears to me to be of utmost importance that the Christian adopt what may be called the confessional stance in the academic community. We do not speak as though we were the Messiah bearing truth and salvation. Rather we stand admitting our participation in sin, pointing not to ourselves but to Jesus Christ who is the Truth and the Redeemer. Nor do we direct attention to Jesus Christ in such a way as to suggest that we grasp even the whole truth about Him. Instead, we confess that this truth has grasped us. We believe and we know as finite beings and as sinners. We confess our faith. We do not pretend to occupy some higher platform of truth or righteousness than do other members of the academic community, regardless of their convictions.

Our role amid the intellectual tensions and opportunities of the academic community may be suggested best perhaps by recalling the problem set by John Calvin in his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. In the beginning of this work on Christian doctrine, Calvin writes: "True and substantial wisdom principally consists of two parts, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourselves." Yet we can gain reliable knowledge of neither by our own powers, for man throughout the range of his abilities is corrupted by sin, by partial vision, by distortion of the knowledge to which he does attain. Knowledge of God and man toward which we strive is gained not through our own efforts but comes as a gift from God through Jesus Christ in whom is revealed both true God and true man.

The Context of Confirmation

JOSEPH SITTLER

If one asks how the life of God is available to the life of man — and carries on that inquiry under the terms Nature and Grace — he is tightening the theme down in two decisive ways. When he says Grace he is acknowledging that he is not discussing whether God is. He is speaking about God on the presupposition that the God who is has a will. And the name and content of that will is Grace. The term Grace designates the will of God as a will-to-the-restoration, fulfillment, blessedness of man. And by the term Nature one announces that he proposes to ask the question about the availability of the Grace of God for man as man has his actuality in the matrix of nature and in the human community of his fellows. If then the Grace of God is available to community-imbedded man, and if the announcement and morphology of this Grace is manifested in a story, it follows that the context within which verification is to occur must be no smaller or leaner than the dramatic scope and implications of the original story.

In the Christian story a magnitude claims to invade, address, and reinterpret every structure and process of the human magnitude. These two, God's Grace and man's life and predicament, collide and interpenetrate. Within the entire tumult thus produced must occur whatever verification is possible. Nor dare it be conceded that the theatre of this tumult is identical with only those issues and decisions that arise within the dimensions of one's immediately personal life. For just as the Christian story has engendered and invested its power and fascination with dogmas, institutions, and liturgies, so the other magnitude, man's immemorial story, has similarly expanded and solidified its movement in garments of high symbolical eloquence. A culture, nothing less, is the appropriate compass of the personal world.

Two terms in that paragraph require amplification. First, verification. To verify means to confirm the authenticity of a claim. The term is broader and deeper than to prove, to establish, or to validate. One does no service to the Christian story to tell it with the intention to prove that it is the truth, or to establish its truth, or to validate its promise and claim. The context of verification requires rather that it be so laid over against and related to the human story that its self-authenticating power is released. The very fact that the reality of the

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Grace of God is communicated in a story that occurred on earth — and not in postulates, principles, or propositions — serves to suggest what is intended here by a distinction between verification-as-proof and verification-as-authentication. A story exercises force according to the depth of its self-authenticating penetration of the situation to which it is addressed. If it does not succeed on those terms there are no others to which it can turn.

Something close to this is surely what Kierkegaard meant when he wrote, in what appears on the surface to be but a particularly cranky paragraph by a very fussy man,

Where spelling is concerned I bow unconditionally before authority — Punctuation is another matter; on this point I will not bow before anyone on any condition. I punctuate a scientific work differently than I punctuate a rhetorical work . . . The abstract rules of grammatical punctuation do not suffice for rhetoric . . .

A general, and very important light is cast upon these words when we play them over against another paragraph from *The Journals*:

Aristotle relates the art of speaking and the medium for awakening faith to probability, so that (as opposed to knowledge) it is concerned with that which can be apprehended in a different way. Christian eloquence would differ from Greek eloquence in this, that it is only concerned with the improbable, with showing that it is improbable so that a man can believe it. It is just as important to reject probability in the one case as it is to reject improbability in the other, but in each case it differs from knowledge in the same way.¹

When Professor Paul Tillich sets forth the Christian story according to an *analogia imaginis*, he intends to distinguish between a way of speaking about God and a way of knowing God. In this regard he and Kierkegaard, with his insistence that there is a peculiar rhetoric of faith, are commanding the same thing and making an identical protest. They are commanding the position that the story of the Grace of God, in virtue of the fact that it is a story, has profound consequences. A story is an occasion that is transparent to a total reality. Its facticity ties it to life in its organic wholeness, its narrative-character affirms its target to be man-as-history and not simply man-as-nature, and its freight of trans-literal terms that are not only patient of but inwardly demand symbolical apprehension announces the possible-in-depth and not the positive-probable as the region toward which it drives.

¹*The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard: A Selection*, ed. and tr. by Alexander Dru. London: Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 198.

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I

The proclamation of the Grace of God in the form of a story of a man of earth who actualized the fulness of the life of God among the broken fragments of nature — this story-form has from the very beginning been threatened by two efforts: the effort to attach its verification to propositions, and the effort to attach its verification to existence. Both are present today, both presume that verification can occur in ways strange to the amplitude of Grace in a story, and both must be described.

The first meets us in the eagerness with which the various philosophical positions have turned to one or another of the forms of analysis to explicate the meaning, or expose the non-meaning, of the terms of the Christian story. These efforts range all the way from those who assert that philosophy is wholly critical, to a more flexible contemporary group who assert that analysis is the "begin-all" for philosophy but are undogmatic about the "end-all."

To these efforts a double reply must be made. The first is positive. All efforts that serve to clarify what kind of a statement is being made and what kind and level of fact would confirm it, are useful efforts. Analysis requires of Christian theology that it become excruciatingly self-conscious concerning what kind of explication it is undertaking. Antiseptic and astringent criticism of the form of Christian affirmation can only beget clarification and precision in designation. Insofar as analysis constitutes a caustic reminder that propositions have but a limited ability to communicate powers it is saying nothing new; it is saying something very old but regularly neglected.

The negative part of the reply to analysis is simply that it is often a painfully systematic missing of the point. By seeking to set up adequate canons for intelligibility and verification it is actually engaged in a humorless constriction of the very terms it brings under analysis. For when a term exercises its power within an entire complex of terms used in a story, the accumulating force of the unfolding drama invests these terms contrapuntally with an intention and force which cannot be justly heard in any other context. When for instance Israel's God is reported to have addressed this vacillating and forgetful ancient people in the sentence, "I have called thee by thy name, thou art Mine," the intention and force of that address is loaded from behind, as it were, by meanings which, apart from the story, are incomprehensible.

Whether we accredit these elements with truth is nothing to the point. These elements constituted the meaning of Israel to Israel — imbedded in her own reading of her historical career. The personal name for a man of Israel was not an individual label; it was a seal, a burden, a signal of delight in the Covenant relationship to God, a positive banner of personal identity. The name *Jacob* is changed to *Israel* in the community's recognition that henceforth this man has in

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life a different role because of his wrestling with God's angel. From one whose self-understanding was determined from within as one who grasps, supplants, his role among his people is violently changed from the active to the passive voice. He is now the one who has been grasped, the one whose own self-hood has been supplanted by a superior determination.

This relation of form to content in ways of communication was recently made freshly forceful to me in an enquiry removed from biblical and immediately theological interest by a considerable distance. Why, I have wondered, does Joseph Conrad so regularly employ the device of a narrator in his tales — and is there a pattern behind his employment of the device for certain kinds of characterization? The answer comes when one recognizes that this relentless analyst of the moral condition of man never raises his voice. In a manner that may account for our neglect of him in these loud and passionate days, he requires a certain quietness and removal from his dramatic situation to operate upon it with the surgical deftness that distinguishes his art. Professor Morton Zabel comments as follows,

He [Conrad] was never at his best when writing too close to himself — his private history, his secret emotions, the self behind the mask. To write his best he needed the distance of irony . . . The intermediary voice — Marlow's or another's — became an instrument of consciousness, a mode of sympathy, a means, especially in [the novel] *Chance*, where the narrator is sometimes five times removed from the event he is detailing — of presenting experience and intelligence in their fullest possible complex of handicaps, prejudices, distortion, and human obstacles.²

II

When affirmations about God and man and nature are made in the form of a story, the context in which intelligible hearing shall occur and confirmation be evoked is nowhere short of the massive and organic story of man, man in his analysis and his anguish, his vision and his dread, his lusts, longings, loves, and loneliness. And that assertion provides a bridge to a second assertion: that our hearing of the story is threatened by our disposition to make its verification dependent upon the reigning and radical existentialism.

It is not proposed at the moment to speak of existentialism as a philosophical position, a political or personal position, or a literary and artistic way of handling material. For the purpose of clarifying the nature of its threat to prehension of Grace proffered in the form of a story it is sufficient to describe its practical conse-

²"Introduction," *Viking Portable Conrad*. New York: The Viking Press, 1959.

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quences. For very many in our time existentialism is an invitation to constriction; and peculiarly perilous because it proposes on profoundest grounds a way of evaluation that fits like a glove man's disposition to egocentricity. The peril is not only that the existentialist is tempted to ignore the transcendent dimension; he performs the nearer and more amazing feat of ignoring the actual historical dimensions of the self. The existentialist would approve with a glad shout all that was elaborated in the previous lecture about man's nature as definable only in his co-existence with the neighbor whose existence he postulates in love and by whom his own existence is postulated and has indeed whatever being it has.

But the self may be shrunk into actual untruth by the very violence of the existential insistence. The moment is indeed crucial, but it is not total. My existence may become clamant and commanding at a point; but the revelatory power of the point constitutes a beguiling temptation to shrink myself to the dimensions of the place where I discovered myself. A good case could be made, it seems to me, for the definition of a University as an organism for learning that exists for the annihilation of existential innocence. For a University deliberately sets up and supports forms of discourse about the world which guarantee that the context of confirmation shall never be single or simple. A University may indeed become a focus for the mobilization of knowledge for a succession of crash-programs. But this frantic function is strange to her nature. The conquest of nature is not her end, her vision is not appropriate to a program, and in her tough heart she knows this. A University is a microcosm of the city of this world; and her purpose is urbanity. Overarching the succession of existential points and passions, she cherishes the multivoiced noises of the great city of man and the cast of her mind is civility.

Over the second and completely personal half of this lecture I want to post a proposition of St. Thomas Aquinas; and I do that not only because I think it grandly inclusive and true, but because it is magisterially objective to the personal account I want to make and may suggest solidarities of structure beyond each or any man's report. *Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit.* Grace does not destroy nature, but fulfills it. As I now proceed to speak of certain perceptions and confirmations which have been given me where I have known my nature within its environing nature not destroyed but fulfilled by Grace, I cannot assume a position above or outside or even hostile to the Church Catholic. An utterly cool and detached *apologia* would be an impossibility and, if attempted out of the peculiar deference venerable institutions sometimes excite, a lie. The story whose movement and meaning and culminating Man has sounded like a figured bass under the polyphony of my experience has indeed created astonishment, cries of sheer incredulity, always and today doubt — but never anything but fascination.

These pages have been squeezed out of torment. For what is now necessary is not easily done. Is it really possible to re-enact the interior history, the strong

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but elusive unfolding whereby exterior terms, learned before reflection, have actually become invested with interior confirmation? Is it possible to state how a propositional teaching has matured to exercise an ordering function within the mind, a dogma became an awakener of natural sensibility, and remained to rule with quiet sovereignty? Is it possible, apart from the liturgical referents operating in opulent concert, to state how the corporate solemnity of the community of Grace may so ensconce a bitter private moment that its dimensions are beheld as general and at the same time made known to exist within a strange Grace that both drives to penitence and despair and beckons toward forgiveness?

III

No, this is not possible. But to speak of Nature and Grace as if such speaking could evade the effort is also not possible. Allow me therefore to set up phrases which suggest interior stresses in common experience and to explicate as well as I can how they have constituted a prologomena to Grace. And if, along the way, there are scattered phrases from the poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins, that is because I know no other man who matches him in jagged and luminous utterance as the facts and occasions of the human story are penetrated by persistent flashes from the story of Grace.

First then, *possession and immolation*. By possession I mean all that a man envisions, strives to master, and being under subjection, take to himself. Possession includes knowledge and people and role and status and all of those effectual operations of the self in which the available becomes ordered to the patterns of desire. Possession, thus broadly understood, is the story of man's life. Its passion is steady, its objects are infinite, its ways direct and subtle, its force the most immediate and pressing we know. And it is no evil thing. It is the fire of nature and the creator of culture. It is the excitement and the lure of the physicist, the chemist, and the mathematician; its power the deft and evocative precision of language. It is the form-world of music, that mimesis of movement and instantaneous distillation of the depth of life which is the drama. It is the torment and the delight of love, and the innermost glory of men's minds ordering chaos into concept and fugitive pattern into appropriate word.

But there is a dialectic operating within possession that I can only call immolation. For analysis of the state of desire or possession discloses an awkward discontinuity in this drive. Mr. C. S. Lewis in his book, *Surprised by Joy*, has spoken of it with clarity equal to its subtlety. He writes,

It seemed to me self-evident that one essential property of love, hate, fear, hope, or desire was attention to their object. To cease thinking or attending to a woman is, so far, to cease loving . . . But to attend to

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your own love or fear is to cease attending to the loved or dreaded object. In other words, the enjoyment and the contemplation of our inner activities are incompatible. You cannot hope, and think about hoping at the same moment; for in hope we look to hope's *object*, and we interrupt this by turning around to look at the hoping itself. . . . The surest way to spoil a pleasure is to start examining your satisfaction.

The particular possession for which Mr. Lewis is striving is joy. And what that analysis has to do with that quest, he summarizes as follows.

I saw that all my waitings and watchings for Joy, all my vain hopes to find some mental content on which I could, so to speak, lay my finger and say 'This is it,' had been a futile attempt to contemplate the enjoyed. All that such watching and waiting ever *could* find would be either an image or a quiver in the diaphragm. I should never have to bother again about these images or sensations. I knew now that they were merely the mental track left by the passage of Joy — not the wave but the wave's imprint on the sand. The inherent dialectic of desire had shown me this; for all images and sensations if idolatrously mistaken for Joy itself, soon honestly confessed themselves inadequate. All said, in the last resort, 'It is not I. I am only a reminder. Look! Look! What do I remind you of?'

This progression of desire, possession, the ultimacy of the object, and the immolation that is built into the process is a story that has a strange congruity with a Chorale that I have known as long as I have known anything, *Jesu, Joy of Man's Desiring*. There is more here than piety. All the terms of the problem are somehow gathered up and given a new possibility. The desire, the quest for Joy, and the requirement of an Object — forged and fused within the human story are almost mockingly insistent in the story of Grace. When the dialectic of possession engenders the suggestion of immolation and cries "What do I remind you of?" one is astonished to be entertaining the possibility that, whereas we talk amiably of "man's search for God," we might better talk of the mouse's search for the cat. The assumed priority of the active verb is displaced by the possibility of the passive. One becomes aware that he has heard something like this before; he has been reminded of something. Specifically, St. Paul. "Let no man deceive himself . . . let him become a fool that he may be wise. . . . For all things are yours — the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are yours; and you are Christ's; and Christ is God's." These leaps — all things are yours, you are Christ's, Christ is God's — these leaps are indeed the rhetoric of

⁴C. S. Lewis, *Surprised by Joy*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1955, pp. 217 f.

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faith. But they have a power to engage the mind with the suspicion that all things exist in the gracious regard of God, and that man has the possibility to regard them in their reality and fulness only when he knows himself, the regarer of things, himself to be absolutely regarded. So Hopkins, nineteen centuries after St. Paul — the sonorities of the Apostle now shattered by the weight of other alternatives — has it this way:

Death or distance soon consumes them: wind
What most I may eye after, be in at the end
I cannot, and out of sight is out of mind.
Christ minds; Christ's interest, what to avow or amend
There, eyes them, heart wants, care haunts, foot follows kind,
Their ransom, their rescue, and first, fast, last friend.⁴

IV

The second phase, suggestive of an interior stress which enters the context of confirmation, I have called *Actuality and Surprise*. By that pairing of terms I mean to suggest that the Grace of God which meets us in the life with the neighbor — there receiving, giving, knowing love — meets us also in the actuality of the world as nature. And further: that our affective response to nature has the character of surprise. When St. Paul in the eighth chapter of *Romans* affirms that "The whole creation groans in travail, waiting . . .," he is making as symbolically huge as the hurt and the longing of nature the estrangement which is the root-characteristic of all mortal nature.

But the estrangement can have the quality of estrangement only if one postulates a context of man's existence over against which that term with that meaning might be intelligible. An analysis of man's estrangement so operating is at least as old as Augustine; and his description of its dynamics is as follows: God is the fountain of light. He is "the light that lightens every man that comes into the world." His also is the light that falls upon things, causes them to stand out in clarity for man's perception. The light in which all things are bathed so that they can be seen and the light that lightens every man in his seeing is the same light. Augustine speaks of the light by which things are known and the light in which things are known. "As the sun," he writes, "is the condition of sensible intuition, so God, the inward Illumination, is the cause of all the certainties of the sciences." When Professor Tillich affirms, at the outset of his ontological analysis, that the reality of God is pre-supposed in man's question about God, he

⁴"The Lantern Out of Doors," *Gerard Manley Hopkins, a Selection of His Poems and Prose* by W. H. Gardner. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1953, p. 29.

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is constructing a huge commentary on Augustine's further statement, "Thou hadst not sought me hadst thou not already known me."

Now one may not believe all of this. And my purpose is not to argue for belief in it, but rather to suggest that this understanding of things indicates one way of accounting for a fact in common life, in all art, in the joy that pervades the life of the human spirit. For it is here affirmed, not on Platonic but on Judaic and Christian ground, that cognition is re-cognition, that nature can surprise with a strange Grace because nature as God's creation was never outside of Grace, and that our surprise before natural things has an inner continuity with the surprise of forgiveness in the love of our violated neighbor.

The same love that is both command and possibility in the social matrix wherein I am involved with other men is ultimately the love of God; the love wherewith we love is in gracious continuity with the love with which we are loved. It is this love and no other that presents before my eyes the world of discrete things. The love with which I behold them is identical with the love with which I am beheld by God. It is Dante's "Love that moves the heaven and all the stars"; it is E. E. Cummings (to make what is in itself a surprising leap!):

i thank You God for most this amazing
day: for the leaping greenly spirits of trees
and a blue true dream of sky; and for everything
which is natural which is infinite which is yes *

When all light is God's light, when all love is God's love, when all things are God's things — then surprise is the interior climate of life. For love as forgiveness by the neighbor is a surprise, and the same gift-character impregnates and coruscates across the million-faced world beheld in love.

Actuality and surprise. Not all the fabrication and technization and transformation of nature can tear these apart if a primal regard for the sheer facticity of things be not stupified. It is not only that we are to regard with surprise the lilies of the field; we are to remain so primitively unidentified in our being with what we *do* as brokers in steel and copy-writers for advertisements about earth moving machinery that we may still rejoice with Gilbert Chesterton in the "sheer steeliness of steel, the unutterable muddiness of mud." And Hopkins again, "Glory be to God for dappled things. . . ."

V

Finally, as a pair of terms to suggest what is meant by the context of Confirmation, *Pathos* and *Passion*. We have been attending to the proposition that an

*E. E. Cummings, *Poems, 1923-1954*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1954, p. 464.

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organic story requires an organic response; that the context of confirmation is as rich, as supple, and as unpredictable as the story itself. That this has been true in the history of western thought and devotion as its story has been told antiphonally with the Christian story, is demonstrated by the way different ages with their differing needs and ways of feeling the human predicament have pulled into focus now this and now that element of the great story. When the adequacy of the event of Jesus Christ, affirmed to be so in virtue of the consummating and concrete character of its fulfillment of ultimate hopes of men as these were articulated in a Semitic culture, had to be proclaimed to a world of an alien culture and language, the event is blazened forth as Christ the *Logos*; and to the Hellenistic religious cults as *Christus Soter*. When the symbol of the predicament is darkness, he is announced as *Christus Lux*; when the predicament is entrapment by powers without or guilt within, *Christus Liberator*. When the sheer force of demonic captivities seemed absolute, he is *Christus Victor*. And when the long penitential tunnel of several Medieval centuries was coming to a close and Francis appeared, self-called *Le Jongleur de Dieu*, and declared the world *clean* and a theatre for delight because God is clean — how account for the astonishing renascence whereby men again looked with love upon the world and furiously celebrated its color, movement, and variety. One interpreter has stated the matter thus:

It was no metaphor to say that these people needed a new heaven and a new earth; for they had really defiled their own earth and even their own heaven. How could their case be met by looking at the sky, when erotic legends were scrawled in stars across it; how could they learn anything from the love of birds and flowers after the sort of love stories that were told of them? . . . against this gray background beauty begins to appear, as something really fresh and delicate and above all surprising. The flowers and stars have recovered their first innocence. Fire and water are felt to be worthy to be the brother and sister of a saint.

For water itself has been washed. Fire itself has been purified as by fire. . . . Flowers smell no more of the forgotten garlands gathered in the garden of Priapus; stars stand no more as signs of the far frigidity of gods as cold as those cold fires. . . . Neither the universe nor the earth have now any longer the old sinister significance. . . . Man has stripped from his soul the lost rag of nature-worship, and can return to nature.*

Despite all the water that has run over the dam since St. Francis died, our root-problem is similar. Unless the world of nature can again be regarded as a realm of Grace, Nature without Grace has the possibility to violate nature into stunned silence. For the demonic is in orbit, the dimensions of damnation are galactic, and under the sign of the mushroom the predicament festers.

*G. K. Chesterton, *St. Francis*. New York: George H. Doran, 1924, p. 50.

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And therefore pathos and not tragedy is the motif of our self-consciousness. High tragedy requires an heroic alternative rejected in order to sing its somber song. Pathos is characterized by a feeling that there are no alternatives. "God is dead" is a tragic utterance; "God is absent" is pathetic. For the God who is dead could, if alive, save us. But the declaration of the absence of God is a weary dismissal of all alternatives, the acceptance of their being no acceptance. And that perhaps may be the explanation for the focusing, in much art of our time, upon that aspect of the Great Story which is the high, acute opposite of our pathos. In the art of Georges Rouault the constant theme is spun out between the mortal pathos in the mien and faces of the clowns, and the infinite passion in the earthy figures of the Christ — who is here not *Christus Victor*, *Christus Rex*, or *Christus Illuminator*. He is *Christus Immolator*.

... Million-fueled, nature's bonfire burns on.
But quench her bonniest, dearest to her, her clearest-selved spark
Man, how fast his firedint, his mark on mind, is gone!
Both are in an unfathomable, all is in an enormous dark
Drowned.

... Flesh fade, and mortal trash
Fall to the residuary worm; world's wildfire, leave but ash:
In a flash, at a trumpet crash,
I am all at once what Christ is, since he was what I am, and
This Jack, joke, poor potsherd, patch, matchwood, immortal diamond,
Is immortal diamond?

⁷ "That Nature Is A Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection," *Gerard Manley Hopkins, op. cit.*, p. 65.

The Problem and the Mystery of Sin in the Works of Graham Greene

THOMAS A. WASSMER

An English author once described a quaint method he had of wooing sleep whenever he was troubled by insomnia. It was simply to try to decide for himself which saint he would prefer to spend the evening with in conversation. Invariably his litany of saints would narrow down to the saint of sinners, Augustine, and this result was repeated when he experimented on others. Most insomniacs would prefer to converse through the night with St. Augustine simply because Augustine was a sinner, and a sinner is a most interesting conversationalist.

The interest we have in Augustine, the sinner, is the same interest that Graham Greene has in Scobie, in Sarah Miles, and in Maurice. In fact Professor von Hildebrand says in his *True Morality and its Counterfeits* that Greene's novels are characterized by an absorbing preoccupation with sin and the sinner: especially with the sinner who assumes the role of the hero. The virtuous man is presented more or less as the negative counterpart of the sinner . . . "self-righteous, pharisaic, mediocre, or at least unamiable."

Not only does Greene make the virtuous an unpleasant lot to associate with, but (in the view of Mary McCarthy) the most virtuous being of all, God himself, becomes for Greene "less like air in the lungs than like a depressing smog that hangs over a modern industrial city. He permeates the novels and plays with His unfailing presence, and in turn, He soaks up the smells of His surroundings — bad cooking, and mildew and dirty sheets and stale alcohol. You would not think that this was well calculated to make religion attractive to the general public. But the public is titillated by this deity, created in its own bored image. Religion, for non-believers (and almost everyone, at bottom, is a non-believer), has become the new pornography. If Graham Greene's works, in the aggregate, are tiresome, for all their gift of suspense, and 'leave a bad taste in the mouth,' this does not detract from their appeal, for pornography has always been tiresome, while catering to an appetite for novelty; it cannot escape this fate."

Now followers of Greene may disagree mildly or violently with these judgments of von Hildebrand and Mary McCarthy, and we would go along with the attitude that Miss McCarthy has overdrawn the characterization of God in Greene's novels and plays. Nevertheless the sinner is of primary concern for him, and the sinner's struggles for sanctity are of first interest. The sinner seems to love more

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intensely than the pseudo-righteous, the pharisaical and cynical, and for Greene's characters it is more important to love than merely to adhere to what others would refer to as God's law. The position seems to be taken that there are many *juridically righteous* persons who do not love and that it is not difficult to infer that the true substance of Catholic living is love and not the sheer performance of external acts of piety.

At times even the most discriminating reader feels as if Greene is more concerned with showing the dichotomy between love and the mere observance of law than with attempting to reconcile the two. It is not surprising then if the sinner who loves more intensely becomes the protagonist of the novel and the righteous or mere observer of law becomes the antagonist. Nevertheless it is precisely here that we are confronted with fundamental issues that are theological and philosophical. Greene's gimlet eyes penetrate into the human soul and discern recesses of the soul that appear to be closed to other eyes. His mastery is in the area where problems converge, and where do problems converge more acutely than in the mystery of sin?

In an article by Herbert A. Kenny, "Graham Greene" (*Catholic World*, August 1957), Greene is called the "connoisseur of conflict." It might also be said that the conflicts Greene discovers between sinner and self-righteous, between reason and faith, between nature and supernature, between human folly and grace, stimulate all sorts of questions for the philosopher-theologian. We shall consider a few of these issues as they are raised by Greene and let others decide if they contribute anything to the discussion of Greene as unavoidably a philosopher-theologian in his own right.

Clinical Analysis of Sin

Professor A. E. Taylor in his Gifford Lectures (*Faith of a Moralist*) characterizes sin as a psychologico-moral experience which is self-condemnatory, indelible, and incommunicable. It is an experience that cannot be destroyed and cannot be vicariously experienced by another. It is this experience which Greene clinically analyzes, and his analysis is one of the sharpest of any literary master. Greene's characters are poignantly aware of the self-condemnatory, indelible, and incommunicable features of guilt and sin. F. H. Bradley, the idealist saw the deepest reaches of personality expressed in the psychologico-moral state of self-condemnation. Greene's Scobie and Sarah, his Father Callifer and Maurice, never seem to destroy this self-condemnation in their own experience, and to this extent they seem to testify to the presence of a disvalue in themselves that must and yet cannot be removed. Despite this experience of tragic self-condemnation there appears to be the groping for some expression of love in the very midst of this self-hate.

The paradox might be put this way (Greene's insight into the experience of

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the mystery of sin brings this paradoxical principle to the surface of his characters' lives): *God is psychologically most proximate when theologically he is most remote.* Let us explain what this means. Theologians tell us that grave sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace which in the event of death of the sinner would bring the punishments of the pain of sense and the pain of loss (*poenae sensus and damni*). The sinner in such a state at present is theologically separated from God in that the union through grace has been broken. Nevertheless on the psychological side God seems to be most intimate and near. Does it not seem to be the explanation of many of Greene's sinners that they are theologically remote from God and yet God is psychologically very present to them in their strivings and movements of love toward him? Does this not offer some plausible explanation for the self-condemnatory, indelible, and incommunicable properties of sin that is strangely associated with the struggle to love God?

We would suggest that this paradox is at the heart of much of the conflict in Greene and that it is a principle theologically and philosophically sound that when God is most theologically remote, he is most psychologically proximate to the sinner in the deepest reaches of his soul. We are inclined to push even this paradox to the fullest in the case of Father Callifer's offering in *The Potting Shed*. God was psychologically present to Father Callifer in all of the sufferings he experienced through the twenty years following the suicide of his nephew, James. When the priest was most convinced of his hatred for God, God was most present to him. From correspondence with Mr. Greene and after seeing the play three times, twice in his company, we are shedding most of our doubts that this was the meaning of the play. Granted Father Callifer had sinned in some way, he had never really lost God in a genuine loss of faith. Sins can be grave without a concomitant loss of faith, and it would seem that Father Callifer did not lose the theological virtue of faith from the experience with his nephew in the potting shed. He offered what he loved most, and at the moment of that offering it was not clear in his mind what he did love most. This would explain his hesitation when he recalls the occasion, or rather when in fact he does not recall it, because it is James who puts the words in the priest's mouth some twenty years later.

Even if it be granted that in Father Callifer's case there was a genuine loss of the theological virtue of faith, the paradoxical principle we enunciated above would still have an application. If Father Callifer had lost all supernatural life (including the theological virtue of faith) by what some would find to be a public statement of strict heresy, the principle would still be appropriate that, although God was theologically remote from his soul, he was through the twenty years of self-condemnation most proximate to his soul psychologically. To consider the first hypothesis — no genuine loss of faith — is to accept some more plausible explanation for the intimacy of this presence in psychologico-moral experience through the operation of actual graces in conjunction with the minimal supernatural life of the theological virtue of faith.

Maritain refers to the new atheism which is only an apparent flight from God and an implicit acknowledgment of his omnipresence. This is another way of stating the principle that God can be theologically remote from us through sin and the privation of sanctifying grace and yet can be so intimately present to our souls in the psychologico-moral experience of guilt which is always self-condemnatory, indelible, and incommunicable.

The Loss of God

There is another theological principle that we would suggest to be applicable in the novels of Greene. This principle has been suggested in the projected application that we make from readings in Father Leen's works and in the writings of Maritain. It is a proposition in theology that grave sin brings with it eternal punishment of sense and of loss of God, should the sinner die unrepentant. Father Leen in one of his books develops the familiar idea of sanctifying grace being the inchoation of the beatific vision (*visio Dei beatifica inchoativa*) and also being the fountain springing up into eternal life (*fons saliens in vitam aeternam*). The point he wants to make is that no Catholic should be unhappy if he is in the state of grace because he possesses in his soul the inchoation of the beatific vision, the same life that he will have in heaven.

May we not just take the converse of this reasoning and argue that the sinner in his present privation of sanctifying grace is experiencing in his psychological-moral state of separation from God something comparable to the pain of loss (*poena damni*)? Would this suggest some foundation, theologically and philosophically, for the inner tragic experiences of Major Scobie and both Maurice and Sarah? Does it offer any reasonable explanation for some of the words of James Callifer in *The Potting Shed*: "He's in my lungs like air," "Then God comes back like memory" — and for some of the colloquies included in the diary of Sarah in *The End of the Affair*? We offer this principle then for some possible insight into the characters of Greene's novels and plays: just as a person in the state of grace has within his soul the beginnings of eternal life and should therefore be supernaturally happy, so the person in the state of sin has been deprived of sanctifying grace and is experiencing in his psychologico-moral state of separation from God some of the terrifying reality of the pain of loss. We leave to others more competent than ourselves to test the validity of the principle in the long catalogue of Greene's novels.

Theological Faith and Rational Disbelief

We should like to refer to another situation in Greene's works which causes some difficulty for the philosopher-theologian. In "Visit to Morin," published in *Harper's Bazaar* for January 1957, Pierre Morin, the author of *Le Diable au Ciel* and *Le Bien Pensant*, becomes the center for a curious speculation on the nature

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of faith. Dunlop, a buyer and seller of wine, comes to visit Morin on Christmas Eve. Dunlop, himself a non-Catholic, had some experience with the faith through a conversation with a Catholic chaplain who had lent him two books — "one a penny catechism with its catalogue of preposterous questions and answers, smug and explanatory: mystery like a butterfly killed by cyanide, stiffened and laid out with pins and paper strips." In the course of the conversation with Morin, Dunlop is advised to avoid theology if he would want to believe: "A man can accept anything to do with God until scholars begin to go into the details and the implications. A man can accept the Trinity, but the arguments that follow. . . ." Dunlop is asked by Morin: "Can you find anything more inadequate than the Scholastic arguments for the existence of God?" . . . "I used to get letters saying how I had converted them by this book or that. Long after I had ceased to believe myself I was a carrier of belief, like a man can be a carrier of disease without being sick."

Through this complex analysis of the relation between faith and belief we wonder whether Morin means by *faith* the supernatural theological virtue of faith and by *belief* the series of rational propositions that provide the plausible arguments for strictly theological propositions. Is Greene attempting to say, what no theologian would question, that the theological virtue of faith is compatible with some ignorance and scepticism concerning the rational arguments for the existence of God? In other words is he saying that a man can have consummate theological faith and at the same time some subjective doubts about the rational arguments in apologetics? Conversely, is he saying that a man can rationally accept all reasoned arguments for God's existence and still be without faith? No one would quarrel with him on the possibility of finding a person who accepts the rational arguments for the existence of God and still is without the theological, supernatural, gratuitous gift of faith. Priests and laymen have confronted so many souls of this kind and their prayer to God is that he grant the *illumination intellectus et impulsio voluntatis* that will bring them on the way to Christ's Church. The paradox of the man of reason who rationally accepts God but does not have theological faith has another side to it. It is equally true that a person with the theological virtue of faith can still find difficulties and growing dissatisfaction with some rational arguments for the existence of God while never questioning the fact of the radical capacity of the mind to know that God *IS*. Such an individual avoids Fideism by admitting the power of the mind to know God exists, but his discontent is with the arguments that have been used by so many philosophers. Certainly the Church has never canonized the immanent cogency of any of the arguments for the existence of God or declared that a specific argument compels intellectual assent by *every* intellect. Admittedly, the person who would sceptically question *every* rational argument while still insisting that he accepts the validity of the human mind to prove the existence of God, might be pouring too much acid on the efforts of the mind and be left with a

faculty that will *never* be convinced. If it is Greene's position that theological faith and some rational disbelief (in the sense of dissatisfaction with rational arguments) can operate as polarities in the soul, and if he is illustrating that point in *The Potting Shed* and elsewhere in his novels, we would agree that he is on secure ground.

Nevertheless the principle of the compatibility of theological faith and rational disbelief (in the sense of dissatisfaction with rational arguments) may not be pushed too far. We suggest that it provides some explanation of the problem of faith and belief in Greene's works and for much of the paradoxical cerebrations by Greene's characters. We suggest that this distinction between theological faith and rational belief, if made by the Reverend Mother in the convent school where lived the precocious young lady of Mary McCarthy's short story, would have put an end to the bewilderment and consternation caused by her protests that she had lost her faith because she could not accept the five rational arguments for the existence of God from St. Thomas. The Reverend Mother might have insisted upon the compatibility of theological faith with some tolerable dissatisfaction with rational arguments, adding that this young lady (Miss McCarthy ?) had not necessarily lost her faith simply because Thomistic Natural Theology was not compelling to her sceptical mind. Had Reverend Mother insisted upon the distinction and had Miss McCarthy realized it herself, she would have been without a short story that still baffles many and sometimes provokes discussion on Reverend Mother's methodology rather than on her unawareness of theology.

Twists and Inversions

We have drawn upon three principles which we suggest explain somewhat the enigmas and mysteries in Greene. We suggest that they are defensible principles for Greene to employ and that they serve to clarify and illuminate some of the paradoxical behavior of his leading characters. The three principles are at the root of the conflicts established by Greene and make intelligible his treatment of the problems of guilt and of sin.

We have but one more observation to make in the interpretation of the conflicts found in his novels and plays. There is a remarkable twist of the pact between Sarah and God in *The End of the Affair* and between Father Callifer and God in *The Potting Shed*. In the first pact Sarah comes upon what she considers to be the dead body of Maurice and says equivalently: "If You let him live, I will believe" which she hastily changes to: "If you let him live, I will give him up" — because she argues that belief is easy and that by merely saying one believes, by that very statement, he does believe. In *The Potting Shed* there is a reversal of the terms of the pact and now Father Callifer says (once again equivalently): "If You let him live, You may take away what I love most." It is James, the nephew, who alters these words of the pact to identify faith with what

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Father Callifer loved most. Mr. Greene does not make it so simple for us as he does for James to make this identification, and to keep the pact on secure theological foundations so that it be not jerrybuilt, it is wise not to make this identification. The tantalizing feature of Greene is that we still wonder whether Father Callifer himself made this identification, just as we still wonder about Scobie's act of contrition.

We suggest therefore that there are significant twists and inversions in the characters and themes of Greene's novels and plays and that these twists and inversions pivot around the same radical conflicts regarding the problem and the mystery of sin.

Briefly then these are four points we would like to suggest for further discussion on Greene's mastery of conflict:

First: Greene uses frequently the paradoxical principle that God appears to be psychologically most present when theologically he is most remote.

Second: Just as a person in the state of grace has within his soul the beginnings of eternal life and should therefore be supernaturally happy, so the sinner in the state of theological separation from God is experiencing, in his psychological-moral condition of guilt and sin, some of the terrifying reality of the pain of loss.

Third: There is a compatibility between theological faith and rational disbelief (in the sense of dissatisfaction with rational arguments) but it cannot be pushed too far. Possibly Greene does push the principle too far on occasion.

Fourth: There are significant twists in the themes and characterizations of Greene which center around the fundamental conflicts involved in the problem and the mystery of sin.

The Goshen College Theological Workshop

J. LAWRENCE BURKHOLDER

In recent years much has been said about the need for a more vital relation between religion and the liberal arts. To separate these realms into sealed compartments has been considered by many to be detrimental to both since religion must permeate life in order to be real, and life, as represented by the arts and the sciences, cannot be fulfilled without religion. Accordingly teachers in the liberal arts have been encouraged to pay more than passing attention to theology, and theologians have been encouraged to take up the task of Christian culture.

To dwell on the need for a genuine correlation of religion with secular studies is probably beside the point for readers of *The Christian Scholar*. The pressing question among those who are genuinely concerned is the question of how the average college faculty with its multiple pressures can find time to become articulate in theology. Unless the task of relating the Christian faith to the arts and the sciences is to descend to the level of forced exegesis, moral platitudes, sentimental religiosity, and dishonest science, the teacher must have a knowledge of theology beyond what is normally expected of the average layman. The practical question is how to get it.

For a number of years Goshen College¹ has wrestled with this problem. Some time ago its Board of Education considered a substantial budget to provide an opportunity for the faculty to study the Christian faith as related to higher education. This however never matured because of other financial pressures. In 1957 when the Lilly Endowment offered competitive grants to private colleges in Indiana for the improvement of the teaching of religion, the college seized this opportunity to propose a grant for a Theological Workshop for the entire faculty as a significant first step. Specifically the proposal called for a Theological Workshop lasting three weeks on the College campus with a program consisting primarily of seminars, lectures, and informal discussion. The proposal was awarded \$30,000 of which \$15,000 was used directly for the Workshop, primarily for faculty salaries. This turned out to be one of the most significant events in years for the religious and academic life of the faculty.

The Workshop was planned and administered by a special committee under the chairmanship of a member of the Department of Bible. The Committee was broadly representative of the faculty. Planning was completed about six months

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¹Goshen College is located in Goshen, Indiana. It is related to the Mennonite Church and has an enrollment of about 800 students. A more detailed report may be obtained by request from the author.

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before the Workshop and the entire faculty was kept informed about developments.

One of the major questions was whether the faculty would respond favorably to the idea. Understandable anxieties about a possible prejudice against theology, indoctrination, regimentation, and loss of August vacations were soon dispelled by the unanimously enthusiastic attitude of the entire faculty of 70 members. Not a single faculty member declined to participate for lack of interest.

The lectures were designed to present the meaning of certain central doctrines of Christianity for the liberal arts. Nine theologians from the Goshen College Biblical Seminary and from other institutions and denominations spoke on a variety of themes. Such subjects as "The Religious Use of Language," "Christianity and Culture," and "The Meaning of the Incarnation for the Liberal Arts" brought to the faculty a new appreciation of Christianity as a vital frame of reference.

The most valuable aspect of the Workshop experience may have been the opportunity to work together on common problems in seminars. Each participant joined the seminar of his choice. Seven seminars worked on basic problems such as "Christianity and Culture," "The Meaning of History," "Christianity and the Fine Arts," and "Christianity and the Behavioral Sciences." They were organized several months before the Workshop began in order to define the central problem and to be ready for work. At the close of the Workshop each seminar reported its findings to the entire faculty in the more leisurely atmosphere of a retreat in northern Michigan.

At the close an evaluative questionnaire was circulated among the faculty. From this and other sources, the following observations may be made.

1. The faculty as a whole found theology fascinating. Theology's reputation for dryness was simply not sustained. It was found to be living and relevant. Over ninety per cent stated that the Workshop had made a significant contribution to their thinking.

2. It was a unique experiment in interdepartmental communication. Members of all departments shared their insights from their varied perspectives in freedom, openness, and honesty. Theologians tried to get inside the world of the scientist and the psychologist and *vice versa*. In the final analysis such conversation was made possible not so much by tolerant attitudes or good dispositions as by the common commitment of the faculty to Christianity.

The nature of the conversation was of course on the level of the deepest human concerns for life and destiny. Teachers stated what they believed and what they hoped. Eventually the interdepartmental conversations became in fact "intrahuman" quests for certainty, vocation, and obedience.

3. The Workshop also contributed to the basic unity of the faculty as a community of scholars. This is not to say that the faculty all believed alike. Differ-

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ences of opinion were expressed which would otherwise have gone unnoticed. The unity which emerged resulted from the clarification of a common, almost overwhelming, problem — the significance of Christianity for higher education in a secular, scientific, pluralistic age such as ours.

4. Another observation is that the Workshop represents at best a first step. It should be followed by further efforts. Naturally most questions were of the kind that are never fully answered. It pointed to issues that need to be studied departmentally. It revealed problems of educational policy with which the administration should wrestle. It raised disturbing questions in the minds of certain individuals that must be worked through. All told, it was an exhausting experience and somewhat frustrating by the volume of unfinished discussion. This led the faculty to express the desire for a follow-up of some kind during the next few years.

5. To give a complete and honest picture, some errors and minor failures may be listed. Fewer problems should have been discussed. Not enough attention was given to specific problems as they emerge in the classroom. One person was probably correct in his observation that "the Workshop did not sufficiently bridge the gap between ivory-tower theological dogma and the applications in the teaching fields."

It should also be pointed out that the abilities of faculty members to handle highly speculative and abstract matters of theological and philosophical importance vary remarkably. Competence in a single field does not always guarantee theological agility.

The Goshen College Theological Workshop has been one of the most exciting and helpful experiences of the faculty for many years. Appreciation goes out to the Lilly Endowment for making this experiment possible.

Poems

by M. SHUMWAY

I

*Where shall be thine earth when
yellow birds no longer heal, when
the sun East set no longer pulses
in the drifting universe, when
silent gulls have left their sea
cresting on dissolving shores turn
white-breasted toward another sun;
where that lift of gentle arm, and
cheek all apricot and amber, is a
weepness to thine image. O thou art
a kind, a kindness, thine Art the gentle
January sun and soft the unsunned January
gray this age of thee; and if thine eyes,
an oracle, spun bright out the nervous
slumber of thin stars, be remembered here,
then thou wert a keep, a keepness, in
mine earth and year.*

II

*There innocence in fallwood wept her lights,
the God-leaved birch, sentinel to the
severaled benediction, leaf and earth;
roots near the scudding river drew deep
to lost logging days in sandstone dells,
her bark chalked with rib and skull of
raucous bearded kings with loghook sceptres
who rode the wild gold that gushed like blood
from wounds of north snows. From narrow kingdoms
kings have disappeared under the suppliant watch;
the river dammed at last bequeathed the kingly
plunder like some rich affliction to take root again;
the fallwood birch and sentinel scatters light in
innocence from root and river, but in her gift has come
the God-leaved sounds of distant rushing waters —
the severaled benediction of the wind.*

Books and Ideas

The Care and Feeding of Intellect

The House of Intellect by Jacques Barzun gives difficulty to the reviewer, or at least to this reviewer. On the author's own account of it the book is a "pathology" of the contemporary intellectual case, and it is therefore neither surprising nor blameworthy that its general tone is negative. But the effect of this is that one is a great deal clearer about what irks the author than about what in fact he is after. The difficulty is increased by the style: one recalls with gratitude and appreciation the fine iconoclastic verve with which Dean Barzun in his pre-deanish days laid about him in *The Teacher in America*. That was an incisive and invigorating critique of higher education in America, an object-lesson both for style and substance. But this current book is so complex in arrangement and so turgid in style that the thrust of the argument is obscured. An example at random:

Not to foresee the irritability of nature, not to halt or shift course before advantage dwindles and turns to drawback, is another form of that groundless faith in the unconditioned with which man unguarded by Intellect tempts retribution.

The context does something for this, but not much since it is for the most part equally and unnecessarily opaque. The effect of it after 250 pages is to create the impression that the author had accumulated a vast card-file of material on the role of Intellect which could only be disposed of by being shaped into a book — but that since he was by no means clear what the material added up to, the book fails for lack of a thesis.

Though the author's abstruseness or the reviewer's obtuseness leaves the main thrust of the argument obscure, there are identifiable themes if not a dominant thesis; and as might be expected in the case of this particular writer, they are always intriguing and often momentous.

The theme which emerges early and which keeps recurring is the care and feeding of Intellect; or to put it more precisely in Dean Barzun's terms, the provision and maintenance of the House of Intellect. Intellect is to be distinguished from intelligence precisely in that it can be housed and must be housed if it is to survive. "Intelligence wherever found is an individual and private

The House of Intellect by Jacques Barzun. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. 276 pages, \$5.00.

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possession; it dies with the owner unless he embodies it in more or less lasting form. Intellect is on the contrary a product of social effort and an acquirement."

Intellect is the capitalized and communal form of live intelligence; it is intelligence stored up and made into habits of discipline, signs and symbols of meaning, chains of reasoning, and spurs to emotion . . . Intellect is community property and can be handed down.

The appropriation and transmission of the work of Intellect is a highly disciplined and therefore a highly selective activity, limited but crucial for the human community. Currently it is menaced by three tendencies, each in itself legitimate, but strangely reinforcing one another to corrode the tradition of Intellect and to undermine the House: they are Art, Science, and Philanthropy. It is unfair to the argument and tends to be misleading to *précis* Barzun's discussion here; but summarily it affirms that pervasive preoccupation with artistic symbols goes hand in hand with a supercilious distaste for "mere intellectuality"; science helps to break up the unity of knowledge; and philanthropy corrodes the intellectual community by insisting, in the sphere of the mind, on "the liberal doctrine of free and equal opportunity." "Nor can there be a finer object of philanthropy than struggling incompetence, since evangelical charity says: give to those that want."

The corrosion wrought by these three factors is traced through succeeding chapters: on the organs of mass communication; on the disappearance of the older felicities of conversation; on contemporary education where the writer has another field-day with the inanities of permissive and pupil-centered pedagogy; on "The Language of Learning and Pedantry"; and on the *mores* and methods of the philanthropic foundation whose effect on our seats of learning "has been simple and may be shortly stated: inflation and strain." Though the burden of these chapters is critical, even derisive, there are hints at construction, including hints for the constructive use of foundation monies! And in the chapter "The Case Against Intellect" there is a careful and discriminating account of the need for conserving Intellect by identifying without exaggerating its role.

Have I found after all that the book has not only themes but also a thesis? Maybe. Certainly there is much in it that is rich and suggestive, much more than it is possible even to refer to here. But the reviewer's first reaction was at least an honest one and ought to stand. The reader might profitably spend some time in checking it against his own.

ALEXANDER MILLER

The Wholeness of Academic Life

The book by Professor Jaspers which now reaches the American reader in English was written at the conclusion of the Second World War, but is not, for that reason, lacking in contemporary appeal. On the contrary the book deals with the primary questions of higher education in a way that is essentially dateless. Because of the tragedy of German intellectual life under the dictatorship of Hitler, the famous existentialist philosopher felt the need of stating anew the principles which were essential to intellectual reconstruction. The treatise, accordingly, includes much that is relevant to life in other countries, including our own.

As the experienced reader will expect, Karl Jaspers attacks his subject on a high level. He is not concerned, primarily, with details of organization or even with curriculum, but rather with an effort to state what the fundamental goal of university education ought to be. His faith is that the clear statement of the aim will help all who are laboring with the details. The purpose, he believes, is not to inform, but to form the mind.

In accordance with his high conception of what education ought to be, Jaspers is concerned with more than the acquisition of learning. It is for this reason that he stresses the necessity of expecting maturity. The artificial prolongation of adolescence in the life of the mind seems to him a major sin. "University students," he says, "are adults, not children."

Part of what is meant by maturity is participation in the entire intellectual life which is radically different from merely taking notes of what a professor says. "University education," says Jaspers, in his closest approximation of a definition, "is a formative process aiming at a meaningful freedom." With such a definition in mind he does not want his instructors to give assignments and personal guidance. The good professor inspires, but he does not guide. The student must be allowed to make his own mistakes.

The best thing in the book, in the estimation of this reviewer, is the insistence on the kind of wholeness of academic life which resists any sharp differentiation between those who teach and those who do research. The teacher must be a researcher, if he is to stay alive intellectually and the researcher must teach. "Hence the combination of research and teaching is the lofty and inalienable basic principle of the university." This is not an economy measure, but the price of excellence.

The greatest weakness of the book is its national provincialism. There seems to be no reference to the higher creative thoughts on the same subject from such

The Idea of the University by Karl Jaspers, edited by Karl W. Deutsch, translated by H. A. T. Reiche and H. F. Vanderschmidt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959, 135 pages, \$3.75.

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minds as are very familiar to us. At the very least we should expect that Professor Jaspers would tell of his points of agreement and disagreement with Cardinal Newman or Woodrow Wilson, but this he does not do. The book appears to be international, but is amazingly German. There is a valid case which can be made for the American university and I wish Professor Jaspers could examine it. We do have a slightly different ideal and I am glad we have.

D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD

Direction and Discipline

Here is another stimulating book from the lucid pen of Elton Trueblood. This volume owes its origin to one address, "The Idea of a College," given by Dr. Trueblood to the Association of American Colleges. The remainder of the book is his further development and application of his *Idea* and ideas about an ideal college. Thus he writes about the following issues : The Teacher, The Student, Administration, Curriculum, Liberal and Vocational Education, The College as a Community, and In a Community, Academic Integrity and Excellence.

In each of the chapters Dr. Trueblood provides us with a clear mixture of wise observations, provocative judgments, and forthright suggested answers. For instance he is in favor of required Chapel and required religion courses in a Christian College. He would like to see a college provide adult education evening classes for the aged in the community as well as for anyone else. He is against "objective" testing and cafeteria elective systems. And he would have student advisors to the President re: faculty evaluation! However readers of this review should not judge these judgments in isolation from the text. The statements above are secondary observations derived from Trueblood's main thesis.

The author states at the outset that he is *not* discussing the nature of the large university or state colleges; he is speaking only of colleges, chiefly liberal arts colleges. His ideal is a Christian college which he defines as a community of scholars and students, some of whom are Christians, some of whom are seekers, some agnostic or even alienistic so long as these latter are open to the issues raised by Christian Theology. But the college also would declare itself officially as a Christian college, require exposure to Christian Worship and the Christian Religion in the curriculum. Dr. Trueblood then paints a moving picture of the ideal Christian College by describing how the committed faculty scientist, historian, economist, etc., would be better teachers, how the college because it has a center of faith would be a genuine community rather than a fragmented one, and how the

The Idea of a College by Elton Trueblood. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959, 198 pages, \$4.00.

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students would be better learners because they would then have a motive for learning, a "vision of greatness," and a "passion for excellence."

Few would quarrel with this ideal if it produced the ideal picture as drawn. And before the cynic discards the book as simply simple idealism, this reviewer would like to recommend especially the chapters on "The Achievement of Academic Integrity" and "The Vision of Excellence" (for the latter see *The Christian Scholar*, June 1959). For here is represented the best of the old-fashioned conservatism of realism, dignity, and integrity. Fluid and open in his method, Trueblood nevertheless calls for clear direction of students, regular examinations, content emphasis, rigor, and the disciplined mind. This is a good antidote to many contemporary hedonistic educational gimmicks which provide no direction, no marks, no exams, no offense, and no displeasure to the student. Trueblood is mad at mediocrity and frank in his desire to cultivate superior excellence.

This reviewer would offer only two criticisms. One, Dr. Trueblood's desire for superior excellence above mediocrity is a valid if debatable position. But I would recommend to him the several writings of the late Dr. Bernard Iddings Bell. In addition to a better defense of this position, I think Dr. Trueblood would also appreciate some of the salty epigrams of Dr. Bell! Second, Trueblood's picture of the ideal Christian college is truly ideal, and thus the problem is: are we Christians that good? I think we are not, and therefore the author needs to state what he would then do to guard against our inevitable sins.

WILLIAM A. SPURRIER

In Honor of Paul Tillich

The primary concern of *The Christian Scholar*, to understand the bonds between the Christian faith and culture through clarification of the relation of theology to the intellectual disciplines, is at the heart of Paul Tillich's life work according to his own testimony.

In spite of the fact that during most of my adult life I have been a teacher of Systematic Theology, the problem of religion and culture has always been in the center of my interest. Most of my writings — including the two volumes of *Systematic Theology* — try to define the way in which Christianity is related to secular culture. (*Theology of Culture*, p. v.)

It is altogether fitting and proper therefore that this series of essays in honor of Tillich should be entitled *Religion and Culture*. It is not altogether surprising

Religion and Culture, essays in honor of Paul Tillich, edited by Walter Leibrecht. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959, 399 pages, \$7.50.

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and improper however that a good number of these essays, solicited on the basis of the prominence of those interested in Paul Tillich, as is customary in *Festschriften*, are included under various divisions of the theme only with some stretch of the imagination. Hence, in the effort to be both relevant and somewhat systematic, attention will be directed only to those essays that are useful in relating religion and culture and that can be used to discuss Tillich's own position.

In "The Limitations and Dangers of Psychology" Erich Fromm's analysis supports Tillich's position as expressed in *The Courage To Be*. According to Fromm the explicit function of psychology and of psychotherapy is negative, to help us to overcome our illusions about ourselves. The positive, the way to full and complete knowledge and to fulfillment is the way of union, the way of commitment, concern, and love. According to Tillich psychotherapy explicitly functions to remove the compulsory patterns of behavior that develop from inability to handle the anxieties of life, those of fate and death, of guilt and condemnation, and of meaninglessness and emptiness. For both, man's fulfillment occurs not through the operation of the healing process of psychotherapy *qua* psychotherapy but when something more is added; that something more for Tillich is faith or courage, for Fromm it is an act of commitment or the union that may occur when the analyst has overcome his own alienation and is "capable of relating himself to the patient from core to core. . . ."

In "The Individual and Mass Society" Karl Jaspers describes the "double polarity that is proper to man; that of the individual versus the collective, and that of the organic community versus planned, technological society." These illustrate Tillich's polarities: that of individualization and participation and that of destiny and freedom. For both, a precarious balance of these polarities must be maintained. Today, for both, the individual is being subordinated to the whole, the collectivity, and the organic ties that make man what he is (destiny) are being sundered by man's effort to create (in freedom) a society more or less complete in its rational ordering. But whereas for Jaspers the guiding image for the present is a "great decision for the individual," for Tillich it is participation in that which will bring proper freedom, the Christian reality of love, the New Being present in Jesus as the Christ. Whereas for Jaspers it is the individual who "can provide the spark for the rebuilding of real community, which may again breathe a soul into the technological world of industry," for Tillich only the power of the living God present in symbol and sacrament can create community.

Three essays (Reinhold Niebuhr, "Biblical Faith and Socialism: a Critical Appraisal"; Paul Lehmann, "Religion, Power, and Christian Faith"; John Bennett, "The Demand for Freedom and Justice in the Contemporary World Revolution") emphasize the truth embodied in Tillich's notion of the Protestant principle. In that concept Tillich and these essays point to the infinite distance between the finite and the infinite, between man's humanly and historically conditioned knowledge and the truth, between man's selfish use of power and the common

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good, between the good that man claims to embody and the good in truth. In the face of this understanding of reality perversions are prevented from becoming demonic by providing an equilibrium of power, processes of trial and error guided by democratic institutions, equalization of power and of opportunities, and freedom for criticism, even of majorities. This institutionalization of the Protestant principle is supplemented by reference to "the power to will the authentic purposes of life" (Lehmann) and "freedom which is obedience to God" (Bennett), but in no case is what Tillich calls the Catholic substance given the attention he would advocate. Without Tillich's careful ontological analysis of the Catholic substance, love, these essays seem to assume that equality and balance of power lead to the actualization of love. At most they season the prescription with the salt of faith. The content or substance of the good, in terms of which political processes are judged, remains formal (equality or freedom) or empty.

In contrast to these three essays and more in keeping with Tillich's position, Charles Malik ("The Spiritual Significance of the United Nations") argues not only for faith in the objectivity of the common good for all men but also for the necessity for transcendent norms and large loyalties that function to curb the self-seeking of individuals and of nations. Without denying the value of the mutuality of challenge provided by institutions that require confrontation of opposing powers and ideologies, Malik asserts that this nation should provide its interpretation of the objective common good for all men if it wishes to hold its own in the world struggle. This corresponds to Tillich's concept of the vocational consciousness of all truly great centers of power.

In the area of aesthetics Karl Barth, (in "Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart") finding Mozart's music pleasing, encouraging, and comforting, insists that it has no message, involves no personal confession, does not give rules, and does not reveal the composer. "Mozart does not wish to say anything at all; he just sings and sounds." He just "lets us hear what he clearly hears, namely, everything which from God's creation presses upon him, rises in him, and wants to spring from him." Thus Mozart's music, avoiding subjectivity, depicting things as they are, uniting word and corresponding sound, yet maintaining the sovereignty of the music, invites the listener "to come out a little from the snail shell of his own subjectivity." But music that is objective, depicting things as they are for Barth means "music that is uniquely free from every exaggeration, basic function, and contradiction." Whoever correctly hears him will perceive happiness outdistancing sorrow, the "yes" ringing stronger than the still-existing "no," and will feel himself understood.

Anyone who has come in contact with Tillich's analysis of art (he does not discuss music) cannot but wonder why Tillich is much more systematic in his description of the objective features of art. Barth's essay on Mozart may well be of course only the beginning of something much more systematic if it were pursued. One suspects however that Barth would shake his head and quip "Why

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not?" if he were asked whether or not a systematic study of music by theologians would be a valid theological enterprise.

The essays by Stanley Hopper ("The Modern Diogenes: a Kierkegaardian Crotchet"), Erich Przywara ("Christian Root-Terms: Kerygma, Mysterium, Kairos. *Oikonomia*"), Gustave Weigel ("Myth, Symbol and Analogy"), and Heinrich Bornkamm ("Faith and Reason in the Thought of Erasmus and Luther"), emphasizing the cognitive problems in religion, need little discussion here. Hopper elaborates extensively the distinction made in Tillich's important essay "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion" (cf. *Theology of Culture*, ch. 2) between the ontological and cosmological approaches. Tillich points out the meaning of the ontological approach (which is his own) for the unity of religion and philosophy in its contention that "God is," *deus* is *esse*. Przywara and Weigel, Catholic theologians, raise two crucial issues, that of the dominance of *oikonomia* over *kairos* and that of the superiority of analogy to symbol in the interpretation of myth.

Three essays deal directly with the relation of religion and culture. In "Christian Faith and the Growing Power of Secularism" Karl Heim argues that mature secularism has grown only in the soil of the Christian culture of the West, a culture in whose old age the "spirit has lacked the power to grasp the unity of the religious aspect of the world." The biblical view of the world in which man is dependent on the Power that gives him being from moment to moment is quite different from that of non-biblical religions and from the present world-view in which autonomous creatures act as if they represented a point of identity between God and the creaturely world. In this analysis Heim and Tillich agree: autonomous man seeks to possess something apart from God, something eternal in itself. For Heim this eternity is sought either in consciousness which by its own power endures beyond the moment (immortality of the autonomous ego) or in objective reality (an enduring substance: atoms, the cosmic law of conservation of energy) or in the moment and its pleasures. Secularism, Heim claims, falls apart by itself, first as the absolute and self-sustaining quanta and standards have been relativized by science itself (Einstein) until nothing is self-sustaining and self-subsistent; everything is completely temporal. Second, technology has deprived man's practical world, his daily work, of meaning. So far Heim and Tillich agree. And when Heim encourages the Christian to join those who relativize the world and man in order to speed the process of disillusionment and to lead them on their knees to seek a view that presents a comprehensive world view and social ethic based on the Bible and directed to the world view of the present time, one thinks he is sympathetic to what Tillich is doing in his *Systematic Theology*; but one cannot be sure from this essay.

Karl Loewith's review of the highlights in the history of the relation of knowledge and faith ("Knowledge and Faith: From the Pre-Socratics to Heidegger") agrees with Tillich's interpretation of philosophy in that the cognitive

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attitude of the philosopher is such as to explicitly avoid subordination to faith but diverges in that it claims contrary to Tillich that there can be a Christian philosophy.

In "The Predicament of the Christian Historian" Georges Florovsky contends, as does Tillich, that the writer of history is always involved in something more than recording facts; he cannot escape interpretation in which meanings and significances are involved. Thus there is a difference between the study of nature (of objects) and the study of man as subject, i.e., of man in his freedom. But whereas for Tillich the historian intends to see events as they were without the explicit jaundiced eyes of faith even though in fact his faith does influence his history, for Florovsky the Christian historian pursues his professional task of interpreting human life explicitly in the light of his Christian vision of life. What this means, in spite of what Florovsky says, could only be determined by comparing his historical writing with that of other historians with different understandings of the task.

Neglect of the other essays (Nels Ferré, "Christian Presuppositions for a Creative Culture"; Charles Hartshorne, "A Philosopher's Assessment of Christianity"; Gabriel Marcel, "God and Causality"; J. L. Adams, "Rudolf Sohm's Theology of Law and Spirit"; Rudolf Bultmann, "Preaching: Genuine and Secularized"; Kurt Leese, "The Church and the Future of the Homeless Man of Today: The Vision of Friedrich Naumann"; Wilhelm Pauck, "Theology in the Life of Contemporary American Protestantism"; Emil Brunner, "A Unique Christian Mission: The Mukyokai ('Non-Church') Movement in Japan"; Yoshinori Takeuchi, "Buddhism and Existentialism: The Dialogue between Oriental and Occidental Thought"; and Helmut Thielicke, "Christians and the Prevention of War in an Atomic Age") in this review ought not to be taken as indication of a lack of appreciation for their content. Enough mental gymnastics have been required already to try to introduce some order into this review. Perhaps one ought to throw up his hands in horror at the thought of a review of such a book, or cudgel his brains to find another way to honor men who, like Tillich, deserve to be honored. The editor, Walter Leibrecht, provides us with a review of "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich" and Peter John's bibliography of Tillich's writings is included.

ALVIN PITCHER.

A Penultimate Ethic of Honesty

Interpretations of man are inescapably normative. Even ostensibly descriptive accounts of human nature and development may be normative. Such an assertion is clearly true of theological and philosophical anthropologies. It is likely to be true as well for interpretations and descriptions derived from the social sciences. Nowhere is this generalization so easily validated as in the views of man coming out of the clinic and out of psychoanalysis. In one way or another the clinician, the therapist, or the psychoanalyst treats three important normative themes: there is something *wrong* with man or with this man; there is a goal or direction of human development, a norm or standard by means of which we know that something is wrong; there is a way to correct what is wrong. Such normative themes referring to individual man are often extended to include implicit or explicit judgments about society, culture, religion, art, etc.

A Christian intellectual may have many good reasons for being interested in psychological analyses of man, but one of his central concerns might well be that of clarifying such normative assumptions and assessing the evidence for the implicit or explicit normative judgments. Since these normative views may run counter to those derived from the Christian faith, this interest may be a matter of identifying "the enemy." Others will feel that they have something to learn from and to contribute to the normative discussions which go on outside the church. In any case the matter of norms is the locus of one aspect of the apologetic task in our time.

Insufficient attention has been given by Christian scholars to the normative discussions within the social sciences. So far as the writings of psychologists go, a thorough critical examination of their implicit and explicit norms is much to be desired. An auspicious beginning has been made by Philip Rieff in his *Freud, the Mind of the Moralist*. Nowhere will the reader find a more careful dissection of Freud's normative views or of those of any other psychological writer. Rieff has three interests: he would examine the explicit normative views stated by Freud; he would penetrate below the surface of these manifest views to the latent or implicit normative assumptions and judgments; he would point to the implications of Freud's normative perspective for men in our time.

For Professor Rieff, Freud is not simply a scientist nor is psychoanalysis simply a science. Freud is a moralist. Though he wished to preserve the image of himself as a scientist, Freud had a far-reaching moral concern. "All the issues which psychoanalysis treats — the health and sickness of the will, the emotions,

Freud, The Mind of the Moralist by Philip Rieff. New York: The Viking Press, 1959. 397 pp. \$6.00.

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the responsibilities of private living, the coercions of culture — belong to the moral life." Freud never simply reports the facts; he interprets them. What passes for description in his method is already judgment. He intuits, interprets, evaluates, Freud's moral judgments are made explicit in what Rieff calls his "ethic of honesty" and in his vision of the psychological man. At the same time ethical concern is latent and implicit in Freud's interpretation of man's inner life and of his social and cultural world. That is, Freud's perspective as a moralist is also disclosed in his understanding of the human sickness, in his interpretations of religion, art, culture, in his attitudes toward women and children, and in his statements about the goals and methods of therapy.

Rieff believes that any psychology which separates the psychic from the rest of biological nature must embody the perspective of the moralist. To have a psychology at all means to understand mind in terms of social and moral behavior. Freud is a moralist in describing and recognizing the human situation as a kind of sickness. He becomes a moralist in still another sense because of his way of conceiving the nature of that sickness. Man's sickness involves his own moral attitudes and those of his culture. There is a hidden weight of moralizing in this manner of conceiving of man's illness. As example, Rieff points to Freud's way of discussing repression and his way of understanding "the unconscious." For Freud memory involves or embodies moral choice. Forgetting is active. "Repression . . . becomes an infallible index of ethical import." Another example of the hidden perspective of the moralist Rieff finds in Freud's attitude toward sexuality. This attitude was ambivalent. Freud's language about sex in terms of tension states contains an implicit moral judgment. His quantification of sex contains a vast ethical metaphor. On the one hand it points toward greater sexual latitude; on the other it tends to depersonalize the sexual life. So too with Freud's social thought. His reconstruction of social origins, while not valuable as either history of anthropology, are "illustrated propositions of value." His social psychology, his analysis of religion, his interpretations of art disclose value judgments at every turn.

With respect to ethical goals Freud was the first completely irreligious moralist. He looked forward to no salvation. To be sure Freud had a message, but the message was a protest against illusions of all kinds. Freud's protest against illusions is what Rieff calls his ethic of honesty. Freud demands only that the individual become freed to live without belief, without illusion, facing himself and the issues of his life without fantasy and without falsehood. This demand for honesty does not lead to hedonism or to the unconditional release of human energies, as some of Freud's interpreters have suggested. Instinct is not to triumph over moral feeling, but instinct and intelligence are to be reconciled. The central problem of human life is that of authority. Authority is necessary, for man's natural impulses must be restricted. But too much repression thwarts such

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possibilities as would otherwise be open to man. Like Sartre, Freud would free man to create his own meanings, but too much is not to be expected. One should expect disappointment. A kind of "stoic rationality" is the closest of the classical intimations to Freud's own way of coming to terms with life. All that can be hoped for is the correction of some of the imbalance between the two main categories of the moral life — instinct and culture. Freud aims at producing the self-conscious prudent man "whose mind has freed itself inwardly from authority."

Freud's ethic is a critical ethic. The most important illusions which are to be dispelled are the moral illusions, the repressions of culture channeled through the conscience of individual man and through the religions of man. These represent the active powers of authority which warp and distort human life. Man must be freed from his personal past and from the past of tradition and culture. The goal of analytic intervention is the destruction of conscience's illusion of self-knowledge. It is the criticism of self-criticism. The one who lives this ethic of honesty about himself is the norm. He is "psychological man." Psychological man is the man who can live by practical experimental insight and so gain mastery over his own personality.

The path to psychological manhood is the analytic way. Psychological man turns away "from the Occidental ideal of action leading to the salvation of others" to the "Oriental ideal of salvation through self-contemplative manipulation." The Freudian strategy is that of "freeing the self of its tyrannies" through the intervention of the psychological expert, the analyst. Therapy is the road to the good life, at least to as much good life as a man can have. Freud's is one of the most subtle of the "contemporary ideologies of self-salvation," and yet the salvation aimed at is not really salvation and the self is not really capable of saving itself. The therapist must accompany the patient along the road to self mastery through the rational interrogation of the past. He can help the patient combine the drives and impulses in a more efficient balance. The analyst can help the individual uncover his hidden self. To know oneself is finally to be known by another. Freud is, says Rieff, "a statesman of the inner life aiming at shrewd compromises with the human condition, not at its basic transformation." The ideal is a negative ideal, an ever-retreating goal. Man is to become sufficiently free to overcome "whatever ought to be overcome" and the overcoming, which is the most one can ever hope to win, is a rational knowledge of the effects of the inherent dualisms upon one's own life. Freud, concludes Rieff, had the "tired wisdom of a universal healer for whom no disease can be wholly cured."

Professor Rieff turns moralist himself both in his shrewd criticisms of Freud's views and in his statement of the implications of the Freudian ethic for modern man. What Rieff is most interested in pointing out is that when accepted by individual or culture Freud's views may lead to a new kind of conformity and

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a new kind of dependence as dangerous as any that Freud criticized. Rieff makes these points partly in his critique of Freud's interpretation of religion and conscience and partly in his discussions of the ethic of honesty. Freud confused religion and culture. He ignored the Christian distinction between faith and its institutions. He ignored also the fact that religion can bring an unyielding individualism in opposition to current social sanctions. In his view of conscience Freud refused to acknowledge that guilt might be really objective or that conscience might be at odds with its social sources. Science on the other hand, with its value neutrality and its value freedom, can easily become enlisted to whatever aims society may have, and Freud's psychology can become an adjustment psychology, freeing the individual from the burden of opposition. In tampering with our repressions Freud may have led us to a new kind of dependence. His new freedom can lead to a calculated conformity, for there are no more legitimate reasons for being rebellious than for obedience within the psychoanalytic view of man. Perhaps religion with its symbols of remembrance may be that very submission to the past which can preserve the capacity for radical criticism of the present, says Rieff.

Furthermore the ethic of honesty can only take man so far. It is valid only so far as one assumes that man has been too much inhibited, but it resolves no specific issues of choice. It may in fact be exceedingly dangerous. Honesty with oneself can lead to the release of evil and destructive impulses. There is no guarantee that such openness may not elicit more brutality rather than less. Freud's ethic turns out to be only a penultimate ethic. It is tooled for the criticism of ultimates, but it regards the "disposition of human potentiality as a matter beyond prescription."

Professor Rieff has written an important book, important because it represents a careful exposition of Freud's thought and because it contains a shrewd analysis and critique of its latent and manifest ethical content. *Freud, the Mind of the Moralist* has a still larger significance. It raises clearly enough for the discerning reader a whole range of crucial questions. What is the nature and status of value judgments generally, and in particular within the social sciences? What is the relationship of value judgments within the social sciences to those derived philosophically or theologically? Are value judgments possible from within the framework of the field of psychology or are they simply importations smuggled in from the general culture or private conviction? Specifically what is to be said of such normative views of man embodied in Freud's ethic of honesty, Rogers' fully functioning person, Maslow's self-actualizer, Allport's maturity, or what Fromm calls in his most recent book, the one who has undergone "de-repression?" Health, maturity, and the like are certainly normative concepts. Can they be defined from within the province of psychology? And assuming that they can be so defined, on what grounds does their determination as "goods" rest? Even when we have advanced satisfactory answers to questions of this

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order the religious man will want to consider the relationship of such norms to those peculiar to the sphere of religion: sanctity, faith, new being, *imitatio Christi*, etc.

If criticism apart from particular points is to be leveled at Professor Rieff's work, it would be that he does not attempt to penetrate to this level. He makes clear neither the ground for Freud's insights as a moralist nor for his blindness. When he comes to challenge Freud from his own perspective as a moralist, Rieff's criticism rests on widely accepted but similarly unanalyzed norms: conformity is bad; radical criticism of society and culture is desirable; freedom and repression may release brutality and evil as well as good.

While there is clearly a more positive normative content in some of the authors mentioned than in Freud there is a common element which runs through their positions as well as that of Freud and Rieff. All of these writers hold that freedom from repression or openness to one's past and present experience in its full range and depth is a good. What ground can there be for this position and how might it be related to a religious view of man? I suppose that it can be argued that such freedom and openness are intrinsic goods of a sort, but perhaps the strongest argument is that they are instrumental goods. They are instrumental to the increase of good. The closed person, or the individual torn by inner conflict, can neither learn from his experience nor be objective about himself and his own experience to the point of changing significantly in any self-directed way. Too much anxiety screens the individual from attending fully to the latent and possible meanings in the flow of events which surround him or impinge upon him. This is why conformity is bad and social criticism is desirable in what transcends the individual. Objectivity and critical judgment are requirements for bettering the human condition. This is why neurosis is bad and self objectification and insight are good for both the individual and the social order. These may be intrinsic goods; we may enjoy them in their own right. But they also can be instrumental goods in that the increase of man's range and depth of experience of values will depend on the presence or absence of this kind of freedom. Yet such freedom can be evil too. It may be used in ways which increase the good for self and others or in ways which threaten or limit the good for self and others. It may, as Rieff suggests, lead to new patterns of conformity or it may lead to a criticism which widens and deepens the human experience of values.

Something of what Freud is after in his ethic of honesty will also I think be regarded as a good from a religious as well as a secular perspective. Only a person with this kind of freedom and insight can learn from experience whatever it is that experience has to teach. Only such a person can be open to constructive alteration and direction of life. The individual who is not open and free from illusions about himself is not "teachable" in Calvin's sense. He cannot respond sensitively to the secular meanings of experience; neither can he respond to the

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divine depth or to the grace "inlaid in the folds of life." Such a view sheds some light on the often raised question about the relation of neurosis to the religious life. This question parallels that which is frequently asked about the relation of neurosis to creativeness. And the answer is much the same. An individual makes a religious response to life in spite of neurotic disposition, not because of it, just as a neurotic artist is creative in spite of his inner conflict rather than because of it. Other things being equal it is better to be healthy, to be free, to have insight, to be de-repressed.

More can be said however from the religious point of view. If the Christian norm be stated as sanctity or as the holy life or as the new being or in some other way, the central characteristic turns out to be that of love. The Christian man is one whose being and doing can be characterized in terms of love. But love presupposes freedom. No one coerces true love, whether it be love of God or love of neighbor. Love must be a free response to the other, a free participation with the other in which one opens himself to the other, sharing life with life and being willing to have the other share life with him. Love may not always achieve such full mutuality, but it intends such mutuality whether it be the love of man for God, of God for man, or of man for man. Love is not a necessary outcome of freedom, but without freedom there cannot be the fullness of love which is agape. From a Christian point of view the kind of inner freedom toward which the Freudian ethic and the various therapeutic views of man point is indeed normative. It may be, as I believe, that Freud and his followers have not fully understood either the dynamics of such freedom, the ground upon which it rests, or the danger which is inherent in it. It may be too that they have not adequately grasped the nature of its fulfillment or the ultimate ground of that fulfillment. What is clear is that they have much to teach the theologian about man and that their normative views, insufficient as they may be, offer a challenge to the Christian to demonstrate the still greater adequacy of a Christian interpretation of man's nature and destiny.

PERRY LEFEVRE

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